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Abstract 
The use of web applications has increased steadily over recent years and they are now 
essential in many areas such as the financial sector, e-commerce, e-government, social media 
networks, medical data, e-business, academic activities, e-banking, e-shopping, and e-mail. 
Furthermore, web applications enable users to interact with back-end data servers to insert, 
delete and modify data content by making a web site their own space. However, malicious 
software (malware) based attacks commonly target and exploit vulnerabilities in Web 
applications, often with devastating consequences to businesses and individuals. Therefore, 
detecting and preventing malware in Web applications has become a significant and timely 
issue. Although there are many malware detection and prevention approaches, the existing 
approaches suffer from many various problems, such as low detection accuracy, high-false 
alarm rates and the inability to deal with new malware attacks. The aim of this thesis is to 
detect and prevent both known and new unknown malware attacks with improved detection 
accuracy and reduced false-alarm rates. Through a comprehensive survey of crime toolkits 
and described attack vectors targeting web applications. A new feature selection approach is 
proposed to identify the key features needed to build intrusion detection systems. In this 
thesis a new framework is proposed for efficient malware detection and prevention that 
overcomes existing limitations of intrusion detection systems. The proposed approach links 
the attack with a suitable response technique. We propose an approach for detecting 
anomalies based on multi-stage rules. The central idea is to apply sequential multi stage rules 
that correctly capture the behavior of abnormal and normal activities. A new approach for 
detect and prevent SQLIA at the runtime. The proposed approach applies negative taint to 
identify untrusted data at the database layer. We have demonstrated the robustness of our 
proposed techniques for malware detection and prevention by testing them on a large dataset 
that contains a diverse many of intrusions and recent malware samples collected over the 
period of 2011-2012.   
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Chapter 1 : Introduction  
              
1.1  Background  
The evolution of the Internet has resulted in the rise of computer Malicious Software 
(Malware). Malware poses one of the greatest security threats to computer systems[1]. With 
increased use of the Internet in daily life, detection of the latest Malware has become a major 
problem.  Malware is a very broad term that describes any kind of malicious software [2]. 
However, numerous definitions have been proposed to describe Malware. McGraw and 
Morrisett define Malware as “any code added, changed, or removed from a software system 
in order to intentionally cause harm or subvert the intended function of the system”[3]. 
Kramer and Bradfield define malware as “ any software that harmfully attacks other 
software” [4]. For the purpose of this research, Malware is defined as any piece of code or 
interaction that causes harm to information systems without the owner’s permission. There 
are several different types of Malware, which include(but are not limited to): viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, spyware, rootkits and backdoors[5]. This research project will focus on 
Malware that specifically targets web applications. 
Web applications run over a network such as the internet or an intranet and enable 
websites to access dynamic content by making connections to databases [6]. Web 
applications have been designed to provide important functions such as online shopping, 
social networking, online banking, web searches, web logs, web mail, interactive information 
and other functions. Furthermore, web applications have been used extensively inside 
organizations to provide fundamental business tasks, such as Human Resource (HR) services, 
   22 
 
payroll systems, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and other busines services. The high 
level system components of web applications architecture are shown in Figure  1.1. Included 
in the web application architecture are user browsers, a web server, a web application server 
and a database server.  
 
Figure  1.1  Web application architecture 
Web applications use a multi-tier architecture, which breaks complex tasks into 
simple tasks, to enable modular functional components, ease of maintenance, component 
reusability, parallel execution and security enhancements. Web applications are designed to 
serve any client to connect to a database through a web browser to provide a service to 
customers [7]. The database tier is at the heart of the web application architecture. It is a 
place where data, such as customer information, financial records, health data, plus any other 
secure data is usually stored. Protection of this data is very important because failure to do 
can result in a significant loss for the organization. From the perspective of the web 
application architecture and the connection between the tiers, if an attacker successfully 
compromises one of the tiers, the attacker will probably be able to extend the attack and 
compromise the database tier. For example, an attacker who achieves unauthorized access to 
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financial systems can cause a lot of financial losses and there is currently no single method 
that can stop them[7].  
Many studies and reports have demonstrated the distribution and extent of losses 
caused by malware against web applications. 286 million cases of malware were identified as 
being responsible for more than 3 billion total attacks on internet users in 2010 [8]. Attackers 
who use malicious software to steal credit card details and other login data costs the global 
economy as much as $1 trillion dollars per year [9]. In 2012,  $110 billion was lost to 
cybercrime around the world[10]. In 2012, 5.4 million Australians were victims of 
cybercrime, with an estimated cost to the economy of $1.65 billion [11].  In July 2012 Yahoo! 
confirmed that cybercriminals had stolen the login information of approximately 450,000 
client accounts [12].  HP Enterprise Security reported different losses for different countries, 
with the US recording the highest losses with $8.9 million in 2012 [13]. In North America 
alone 13 % of home networks were infected and compromised with malware during 2012 
[14].   
A recent study identifies  a new attack that infected nearly 300,000 web pages, with 
the infection containing malicious code that revealed client information and directed clients 
to a fake web site [15].  However, this type of attack event was just one among a sequence of 
malicious activities targeting web applications. Research has indicated that financial damage  
has steadily increased over recent years [16]. Also, a report by the Australian government 
warned that attacks will become more prevalent as more persistent techniques are adopted 
[17]. Thus Malware detection and prevention is vital to secure web applications and reduce 
the losses such infections can cause. 
Figure  1.2 illustrates the model of a web application; basically a web application is 
broken up into a number of components and then interacts between these components.  
Firstly, the client requests a web page which can be either static or dynamic. Secondly, the 
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web browser passes this request through the internet to the web server. Thirdly, the web 
server handles this request based on initial configurations such as HTTP, HTTPS, etc., which 
can also handle these requests by “decoding" the webpage. Fourthly, the web server passes 
this request to the web application server. Next, the web application passes these requests to 
the database. In addition, the web application processes commands, verifies security access to 
the database through middleware and makes logical decisions. After verifying the database 
access, the web application server sends the Structured Query Language (SQL) requests to 
the database server. Finally, the database server executes this request, allowing data to be 
read, inserted, updated or deleted; depending upon the SQL query, and sends back the result 
of the request to the application server.  
 
Figure  1.2  Web application model components and then interaction 
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Web application usage has recently increased. At the same time, the vulnerability of 
web applications has also increased. Attacking web applications is popular among attackers, 
due to the seriousness of the damage and the invisibility of the attack until serious damage 
has occurred. Web vulnerability is a weakness in web application architecture that creates a 
potential threat. This could be from incorrect configuration, poor input validation design, or 
unsuitable and insecure coding methods. Even though the features of web applications make 
them convenient to support and maintain, many of these same features also make them 
vulnerable to attack. As a result, attackers target web applications to access the database 
through SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs) because this type of attack can compromise the 
confidentiality and integrity of information in the databases, resulting in the theft of 
confidential data and the breaking of data integrity, or affecting the availability of the web 
application. 
1.2  Research Questions  
Although Malware detection and prevention developed quickly in the earlier years, many 
significant issues remain. First, detection systems need to be more effective, with the ability 
to discover a wide variety of attacks with less false positives and false negatives. Second, 
with new kinds of attacks it has become very important to detect and prevent attacks against 
whole web applications. Finally, simply detecting attacks is not sufficient for complete 
solution; intrusion prevention systems in web applications are necessary to prevent the 
attacks. Otherwise, hackers are permitted to repeatedly attack web applications until they find 
open vulnerabilities.  
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Mitigating Malware attack is a significant research problem in both system and 
network security domains[18]. This research forms a major initial step towards addressing the 
open problem of identifying any previously unseen or new Malware examples that target web 
applications. These new examples of Malware often adopt obfuscation techniques to evade 
and thwart countermeasures such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The primary purpose 
of this research is to address the following problem:  How can we detect and prevent both 
known and unknown attacks?  
In order to address this question, the following four questions need to be answered: 
Q1: Can a combination of a Signature-based Intrusion Detection system (SIDS) and an 
Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (AIDS) mitigate web application Malware? This 
question is addressed by the proposed design and integrated experiments presented in Chapter 
4. 
Q2: How can the most effective features be selected from network systems and web 
application to detect and prevent Malware? This question is tested by the feature selection 
experiments presented in Chapter 5. 
Q3: Is it possible to generate rules for AIDS to detect both known and unknown malicious 
attacks? This question is addressed by the multi-stage rules for intrusion detection systems 
presented in Chapter 6. 
  Q4: Can a combination of a Signature-based Detection and Anomaly-based Detection be 
applied to detect and prevent SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIA)? This question is addressed by 
developing an approach to mitigate SQL injection Attack in Chapter 7. 
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1.3  Thesis Aim 
In this thesis, we address the problem of how to detect and prevent Malware attacks, 
specifically in web applications. We propose a methodology to protect web application 
against Malware with two lines of defenses: preventing Malware in the first stage and 
detecting Malware at the second stage. We aim to: 
1) Build an intrusion detection framework which has the ability to detect previously 
known and new attacks. 
2) We aim to increase the accuracy of malware detection by reducing the amount of false 
alarms caused by anomaly intrusion detection systems. 
3) Attack Prevention – stop an attack by preventing attack before it occurs 
4)  Attack Detection – detecting an attack while it is still in progress, or to detect an 
attack which has already occurred. 
1.4  Research Methodology 
To address the first research question (Q1) listed in section 1.2; a systematic framework is 
required to combine signature based detection and anomaly based detection systems which 
can run effectively in web applications architectures. We propose a new Intelligent Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System (IIDPS) that combines signature based detection, anomaly 
based detection systems and response action.  We provide a technique to choose the best 
response against an intrusion. Our IIDPS framework is flexible in that it allows for different 
web application architectures to be tested. The communication between the signature based 
detection, anomaly based detection systems and the intrusion response component are based 
on the web application architecture. 
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For the second research question (Q2), we propose feature selection based on 
information gain, which can contribute to the detection of several attack types with highly 
accurate results and low rates of false-positive results. 
For the third research question (Q3), we propose new multi-stage rules for detecting 
and preventing attacks. We used the RIPPER technique for rule generation, which is capable 
of creating rule sets more quickly and can determine the attack types with a smaller numbers 
of rules. 
For the fourth research question (Q4), we propose a general model for protecting 
against and detecting SQLIA based on SQL syntax at the web application layer, and negative 
taint at the database layer. The central idea involves monitoring the data that comes from a 
user’s web browser and matching it with the taint table on the database layer in real time. If 
the user input is recognized as malicious, we can stop the SQL statement from being executed 
thus preventing negative action being performed. 
1.5  Contributions 
We detail the thesis contributions as the following: 
• A comprehensive taxonomy on the current state of the art in intrusion 
detection systems is provided to identify their common shortcomings of the 
existing detection systems. 
• A survey of the current trends in crime toolkits is performed. The types of 
exploits that malicious software undertakes are profiled, with a view to 
predicting future attack trends. It was identified that the scope for financial 
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damage is increasing, particularly as specialisation and scale of cybercrime 
increase. 
• We propose a framework for an effective Malware detection and prevention 
that overcomes the existing limitations of current detection and prevention 
methods for identifying Malware. This framework consists of three processing 
layers: 1) SIDS; 2) AIDS; and 3) RID, which can be incorporated in our 
framework. This framework can detect known and unknown attacks 
efficiently. Also, this framework has the capability to launch response 
mechanisms against a variety of attacks. 
• A feature selection based on information gain is proposed, which can detect 
several attack types with high accuracy and low false rates. Moreover, we 
performed experiments to classify each of the five classes: normal, probe, 
denial of service (DoS), user to super-user (U2R), and remote to local (R2L). 
• A multi-stage rules facility for detecting anomalies in multi-stage rules is 
provided. We used the RIPPER for rule generation, which creates rule sets 
more quickly and can determine the attack types with smaller numbers of 
rules. These rules would be efficient to apply for Signature Intrusion Detection 
System (SIDS) and Anomaly Intrusion Detection System (AIDS). 
• We propose an approach based on negative tainting along with SQL keyword 
analysis for detecting and preventing SQLIA. We have tested our proposed 
approach on all types of SQLIAs techniques by generating SQL queries 
containing legitimate SQL commands and SQLIA. We present an analysis and 
evaluation of the proposed approach to demonstrate its effectiveness in 
detecting and protecting SQLIA attack. 
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1.6   Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 : Background of study and literature review of the research topic. This chapter 
begins with an understanding of the web application attack. Following this, we present 
problems of Malware detection and prevention, and present a review of the literature on SIDS 
and AIDS methods, with a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of these methods. 
To conclude this chapter presents, the challenge of intrusion detection is presented. 
Chapter 3 : This chapter analyses the current trends in crime toolkits that are used against 
web applications. We profile the types of exploits that malicious writers prefer, with a view 
to predicting future attack trends. 
Chapter 4 : This chapter present hybrid intrusion detection and prevention architecture to 
overcome the main shortcomings of the existing IDSs. The proposed detection system is 
based on a combination of a (SIDS), an (AIDS) and an Intrusion Response System (IRS). An 
explanation is provided for each of these methods. 
Chapter 5 : This chapter proposes a feature selection based on information gain, which can 
contribute to detect several attack types with high accuracy and low false rates. 
Chapter 6 : This chapter provides a new multi-stage rules for detecting anomalies in multi-
stage rules, which can create rule sets more quickly and can determine the attack types with 
smaller numbers of rules. 
Chapter 7 : This chapter proposes a new approach for detecting and preventing SQLIA at 
runtime. The proposed approach applies negative taint to identify untrusted data at the 
database layer. 
Chapter 8 : The concluding chapter provides a summary of contributions and future research 
challenges. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
             
This chapter reviews security threats to web applications with emphases on various malware 
related threat. This chapter reviewed the existing kind, approaches and methods of Malware 
detection and prevention in the literature. It also discusses the existing malware detection and 
prevention approaches as well as the current challenges of Malware detection and prevention 
systems that must be overcome to have accurate malware detection systems with appropriate 
performance.  
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2.1  Introduction 
Malware detection and prevention in communication networks and web applications has 
become very important to safeguard network and web applications[19, 20]. Malware 
detection and prevention began in the early 1980s and since that time many approaches have 
been proposed to build robust Malware detection systems[21]. However, Malware detection 
is still in its early stages. In order to identify the limitation of the current Malware detection 
system, we review the literature of Malware detection. We explain the current challenge of 
Malware detection system, a comparative study highlighting the machine language for 
anomaly detection and we identify the different problems of Malware detection systems 
which affect their detection ability. 
This chapter presents the literature review on my topic of research. Section 2.2, 
explains the web application threats. Section 2.3, explains the web application vulnerabilities. 
Section 4, describes the web application attack that is used by malicious writers. Section 2.5, 
discusses the existing malware detection approaches. Section 2.6 provides the summary to 
this chapter and the current challenge of Malware detection systems that must be overcome to 
enable an accurate performance of malware detection systems. 
2.2  Web Applications Threats 
Today, most industries are moving toward to the use of web applications .Despite the 
advantage of web applications they bring with them new and critical security threats. Web 
application threats bring a wide variety of risks, including business damages, identity theft, 
information leakage, and loss of business reputation. A threat is any potential incidence that 
could damage an organization.  Recent trends in web application Malware have become a 
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major threat and are increasing in complexity as systems provide more opportunities for 
automated activities. Furthermore, financial damage caused by Malware to individuals and 
businesses such as steal credit card information has also significantly increased in the last few 
years (RSA 2011). 
The general use of the Internet in modern business has made it increasingly difficult 
to provide a high level of security because most web applications work as distributed systems 
and are built on multiple heterogeneous technologies. In addition, hackers increasingly target 
web applications because they connect with databases that contain sensitive data. The threats 
related to database security include  the following [22]: loss of confidentiality when 
information can be accessed by someone who shouldn’t access it; loss of privacy which refers 
to exposure of personal information; loss of integrity which may be due to corrupt data since 
unauthorized individuals may change data; and loss of availability which means the services 
or systems cannot be reached due to Denial-of-Service attacks. However, Connolly et al also 
define risk as any effect that might damage a database with the system crashing being the end 
result. This risk can be classified as shown in Table  2.1:   
Threat types Description 
Spoofing Techniques that make the data appear to originate from a trusted computer 
to gain access to a system. The attacker uses it to direct Web site users to a 
Web site that appears like the one they believe they are browsing. 
Information 
disclosure 
Information disclosure is the undesirable revealing of critical data. For 
instance, a computer user looks at the contents without permission. 
Denial of 
service 
The cybercriminal tries to make the computer system inaccessible to 
legitimate computer user. 
Tampering. Data tampering occurs when a cybercriminal changes, inserts or deletes 
records in the database. 
Elevation of 
privilege. 
Elevation of privilege happens when a user with limited privileges gains 
greater privileges in the computer system than they are allowed. 
Table  2.1 Web application threats
   34 
 
 
2.3  Web Application Vulnerabilities Exploited 
Web applications use Rapid Application Development (RAD) to accelerate the building of 
complex web application systems; unfortunately this makes web applications more 
vulnerable to attacks because some of security feature are not implemented correctly. A web 
application has many features and characteristics which could lead to infection of SQLAs: i) 
the input query strings contain usernames and passwords that may allow malicious code to be 
injected. ii) Dynamic query statements also help SQLAs as dynamic SQL statements are 
generated based on users input. iii) SQL queries do not contain any information about the 
source for validation. Furthermore, malicious application writers use combination attacks 
such as botnets, hacking tool kits and web application vulnerabilities to make cybercriminals 
more resilient and powerful than ever before[23]. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) revealed that many web 
application vulnerabilities cause input validation problems. Input validation is the process of 
checking all the user input in a web application before access to the database tier (OWASP 
2010). This problem can lead to web application attacks such as SQLIAs.  SQLIAs are not 
only introduced via input from user  but may also be from any external strings or outside 
input that malicious writers use to build a query like string within cookies, a web application 
variable or a server variable. Attackers have various techniques they can employ to find 
vulnerabilities based on the input source that can be used to theft of data, or deface the web or 
to cause a database to crash. These vulnerabilities can breach the security mechanism that are 
designed to prevent, detect and recover [24] from threat to a web application, as shown in 
Figure  2.1. In the case of vulnerabilities, there is a lack of enforced security mechanisms, a 
lack of configuration of security mechanisms and a lack of virus detection systems. 
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Figure  2.1  Relation between threat, vulnerabilities and mechanisms 
However, the main problem causing web application vulnerabilities is insufficient 
input validation. To exploit invalidations in web applications, the hacker needs to inject a 
malicious string into web applications [25]. The most commonly used methods hackers use to 
inject web applications are: parameter tampering which relies on the browser; the attacker 
can change the parameters in Uniform Resource Locator (URL) to bypass the security 
mechanism. For example, in online shopping when the developer uses hidden fields to store 
item product status, attackers take advantage of this hidden file and change the information, 
as shown in the following example:   
<input type=”hidden” id=”321” name=”cost” value=”2.00”> 
In the above example the attacker can change the cost of a product to a lower cost. 
The attacker puts a malicious string into cookies to submit to a web application. Web 
browsers submit the request using GET or POST methods. If the method GET is used, it 
means all parameters and values will be displayed in the browser. The result is that hackers 
can tamper with this query statement. For example, if the following URL is submitted: 
http://www.website.com/page.asp?UserId=6543&value=1, the hacker can modify the URL 
parameters (User ID and value) in order to add another account like 
http://www.website.com/example.asp?UserID=1243&value=9999. In general, hackers 
develop advanced techniques that compromise a database using SQL statements to steal 
information from a database that help to compromise web applications successfully. 
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2.4  Web Application Attack 
Web applications are designed to assist the end user to connect to the Database (DB) through 
a web browser. Unfortunately, web applications and the underlying infrastructures are not 
designed with security in mind. Thus, they have a lot of exploitable vulnerabilities. These 
weaknesses have attracted malicious software writers to take advantage of such 
vulnerabilities to perpetrate attack mostly for financial gains. For example, if a user's input is 
not handled correctly, the web application can be left vulnerable to a malicious attack. For 
this reason, attackers have developed crime tool kits to look for vulnerabilities to launch 
attacks against web applications. The availability of such toolkits, combined with the 
motivation to launch attacks, makes web applications a critical area to study. Table  2.2 
presents the top ten application security risks as reported by the Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP). The table also provides a brief description of the most widely 
exploited vulnerabilities, and the occurrence as well as the impact of each risk. According to 
the report of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), the number of web-related 
vulnerabilities has increased steadily from 2005 –2010 [26]. Table 2.2  shows the results from 
another study by the Web Application Security Consortium’s Statistics Project (WACSP) 
from 2010 [27] that identify the most popular vulnerabilities in web applications.  From this 
table, it can be noted most vulnerabilities are exploited in the database tier. These 
vulnerabilities allow attackers to perform malevolent actions that range from gaining 
unauthorized account access. 
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No Web Application 
Security attacks 
When does it occur Impact 
1 Injection The hacker sends a malicious string 
as a query statement to the 
database. 
Data loss, data stolen, 
modified, deleted, or denial 
of access. 
2 Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) 
Attacker executed malicious code 
in the user’s browser 
Redirect users to malicious 
web sites. 
3 Broken 
Authentication  
When  a session ID is visible due to 
leaks  in the authentication process 
Attacker could do anything 
with the victim’s privileged 
accounts. 
4 Insecure Direct 
Object References 
The attacker change the URL 
parameter 
Compromises all the data 
that can be referenced by 
the parameter 
5 Cross-Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF) 
Attacker sends fake HTTP requests 
to trick a victim into submitting 
them via image tags. 
Loss or modified data. 
6 Security 
Misconfiguration 
Attackers try to find unused pages, 
unprotected files and unprotected 
directories, etc. to reach for 
sensitive data. 
The web application could 
be completely 
compromised without 
knowledge.  
7 Insecure 
Cryptographic 
Storage 
Here attackers don’t break the 
cryptographic, but disclose 
something else to get the original. 
Lost data such as health 
records, credentials, 
personal data, and credit 
cards. 
8 Failure to restrict 
URL access 
Simply changes the URL to a 
privileged page 
Attacker can do anything 
the victim can do 
9 Insufficient 
Transport Layer 
Protection. 
The attacker simply monitors 
network traffic, and observes an 
authenticated victim’s session 
cookie.  
Phishing, resulting in a 
stolen account. 
10 Invalidated 
Redirects and 
Forwards 
Attacker redirects links to 
invalidate and trick victims into 
clicking it. Victims will probably 
click on it, with the security 
mechanism bypassed. 
Redirections such as these 
may attempt to install 
Malware or trick victims 
into disclosing passwords 
or other sensitive 
information. 
Table  2.2 Attack methods in web applications[28]
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  Another report from the Web Application Security Consortium’s Statistics Project 
(WACSP) lists the most common causes of vulnerabilities in web applications, which  are 
presented in Table  2.3  Web vulnerabilities[27]: 
 
Table  2.3  Web vulnerabilities[27] 
The data presented in Table  2.3 shows that improper input handling is equal to 
14.65% and insufficient authentication is equal to 13.38% which helps to increase SQL 
injection. The result is that a SQL injection attack (SQLI) dominates all other vulnerabilities 
and is still the best known type of attack.  It has risen from number two in 2007 to number 
one in 2010 in web application vulnerability, according to Open Web Application 
Security[28].   
2.5  Malware Detection Approaches 
A Malware can be defined as a series of actions aimed at compromising the security of a 
computer network system. It attempts to bypass security mechanisms of computer systems 
Web Application Vulnerability Percentage 
Improper Output Handling 22.29% 
Insufficient Anti-automation 15.29% 
Improper Input Handling 14.65% 
Insufficient Authentication 13.38% 
Unknown 8.92% 
Application Misconfiguration 6.37% 
Insufficient Process Validation 6.37% 
Insufficient Authorization 3.82% 
Abuse of Functionality 2.55% 
Misconfiguration 1.27% 
Insufficient Password Recovery 1.27% 
Insecure Indexing 1.27% 
Information Leakage 0.64% 
None 0.64% 
Improper File System Permissions 0.64% 
Insufficient Entropy 0.64% 
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that threaten the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of computer resources. Malwares are 
used by malicious writers to gain information from the computer network. Intrusions can take 
two primary forms: external attacks, insider attacks [29].  
Malware detection is the method of recognizing user activities that may possibly steer 
computer systems from a secured state to an unsecure state.  However, the Malware detection 
systems could be hardware or software systems that observe activities on computers system 
or computer networks in order to find abnormal activities[30]. The ability of Malware 
detection and prevention to prevent up-to-date attacks is inadequate[31]. The responses action 
with Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be collaborative to response for perspective 
attacks. When IDS detect unusual behavior, it registers a record detail of the event and then 
takes appropriate response by no action, alarm, hold, abort, or delete. 
Based on the input data sources of IDSs examined, there are two main types of IDSs: 
network-based and host-based. Host-based IDSs (HIDS) examine data that originate from the 
host system, audit sources, such as application system audits, operating system, server, or 
database logs. A HIDS detector plays a significant role for detection of inside attacks that do 
not involve network traffic. Network-based IDSs (NIDS) examine network packets that are 
taken from a network. Network-based IDS can be implemented to protect several hosts that 
are connected to a network. NIDS can report an attack that could be launched from the 
external attacker at an earlier stage, before the attacks actually reach the host. However, 
NIDSs have a difficulty to examine all packets in a high speed network due to rate and scale 
of packets. 
Based on examination techniques, there are two approaches to analyse events using 
intrusion detection techniques.  These can be categorized into two classes: signature based 
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detection and anomaly based detection. This next section provides an overview of both 
approaches and shows the advantages and disadvantages of the two IDSs. 
2.5.1  Signature based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) 
SIDS is based on pattern matching techniques to find a known attack. In other words, when a 
known intrusion matches with a malicious string database, an alert is raised. SIDS commonly 
provides good detection results for specified, well-known attacks. However, SIDS cannot 
detect previously unseen attacks because the signature does not exist in the database until the 
signature database is updated. The main advantage of a SIDS is that they are very efficient in 
detecting known attacks without raising false positive alarms and can quickly detect an 
attack. However, SIDS has the disadvantage that a signature must be created for every attack, 
and zero day attacks cannot be detected. A SIDS is also prone to false negative, since they are 
commonly based on regular expressions and string matching. While SIDS works well against 
attacks with a fixed behavioural pattern, they do not work well against the multitude of attack 
patterns created by a human or self-modifying behavioural characteristic. The SIDS has been 
implemented in many popular tools, such as Snort [32]and NetSTAT [33]. 
2.5.2  Anomaly based Intrusion Detection System (AIDS) 
AIDS has attracted the interest of many researchers to overcome the disadvantage of SIDS. 
Anomaly detectors identify unusual user activity on a computer system. The assumption for 
this approach is that behaviour of an attacker deviates from normal user behaviour. AIDS 
constructs a behavior profile of users by using features that are accepted as normal behaviour. 
It then monitors the activities of users and compares the new data with the obtained normal 
behavior profile and tries to detect deviations. Those activities of new users which are 
different from normal behaviour are considered as attacks. To achieve this, AIDS involves 
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two stages: the training stage; and a testing stage. In the training stage, the normal traffic 
profile is labelled by using data that is accepted as normal behaviour; in the latter, the testing 
stage is applied to new data set. The result of this is that the AIDS have the ability to monitor 
the activities of new users and compare the new data with the obtained profile in an attempt 
to detect deviations. Those different from normal behaviour are considered attacks. 
AIDS are categorized into many sub-kinds based on the approach employed to do 
learning in the literature such as statistical techniques, data mining, artificial neural networks, 
and genetic algorithms[34]. The main benefit of an anomaly-based scheme is the power to 
detect zero days Malware because the unusual user profile is not dependent on a signature 
database. AIDS raises an alarm because it differs from the usual activity. Moreover AIDS has 
many advantages: First, they have the ability to find insider attacks. If an attacker using a 
stolen account starts making actions that are unknown in the normal user-profile, it generates 
an alarm. Second, because the system is constructed from customized profiles, it is extremely 
hard for an attacker to identify what is  normal user activity without generating an alarm [35]. 
The other main disadvantage of AIDS is the possibility of detecting a known attack, with the 
result being a high rate of false positives (mistake to determine non-attack). Table  2.4 shows 
a comparison between signature based detection and anomaly based detection [30]. However, 
anomaly detection has an advantage over signature-based engines in that a new attack, for 
which a signature does not exist, can be detected if it falls out of the normal traffic patterns.  
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Detection model Advantages Disadvantages 
Signature based Intrusion 
Detection System( SIDS) 
Low false positive rate. 
Simple to implement. 
High true positive rate for 
known attacks. 
Low detection rate for a new 
attack. 
Requires continuous update. 
Anomaly based Intrusion 
Detection System(AIDS) 
Can detect new attacks. 
Self-learning. 
Raise false positives. 
Unclassified alerts. 
Requires initial training.  
Table  2.4  Advantages and disadvantages of SIDS versus AIDS 
AIDS has been the subject matter of a number of studies. We explore a number of 
various approaches that have been attempted for AIDS. These consist of statistical anomaly 
detection, data-mining based methods, and machine learning based techniques.  
There are two kinds of intrusion detection systems that used SIDS or AIDS: Host-
based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDS). HIDS is dependent on the data that is gained from a single host, whereas network-
based intrusion detection systems gain information by monitoring the traffic flow in the 
network to which the hosts are connected. HIDS is capable of determining if an attempted 
attack was indeed successful. Software set up directly on the host protects against not just the 
attack, but against the consequences of an attack. It is independent of network architecture; 
and can detect local attacks, privilege growth attacks and attacks which are encrypted. 
However, such systems can be problematic to deploy and run, particularly with the amount of 
hosts requiring such protection in web application. Additionally, these systems are not 
equipped to identify attacks against multiple hosts in a network. 
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 NIDS are able to monitor a large number of hosts with reasonably small deployment 
costs, and are efficient to detect attacks over multiple hosts. They can detect network Denial 
of Services (DoS), bandwidth-oriented attacks, SYN flood and others; and can provide a 
larger observation of attack types such as scans, probes and attacks against non-host system 
based.  NIDE relies on statistical anomaly detection techniques. It has a profile of normal 
user activity behavior which is provided by the statistical techniques. This helps the IDS to 
compare the existing user action with the normal behaviour of the variables that are stored in 
the system and then raise an alarm if the result of the comparison is considerably far from 
normal behavior. Every variable in the stored normal user behavior represents a specific kind 
of the normal actions. The next step is calculating the association between variables.  The   
frequency    distribution   is   built   and updated over time, as more audit records are 
analyzed. Table  2.5 shows some examples of Intrusion Detection Systems. 
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AIDS 
 
SIDS 
HI
DS
 
-Gao and others they present a new anomaly 
detection method based on machine learning. 
Applicable to host-based intrusion detection 
systems.  [36]. 
- Xin presented anomaly detection for host 
computers using Sequential anomaly 
detection constructed on temporal-difference 
learning.  A Markov process model was 
represented for the anomaly detection and 
alarming process of sequential data[37]. 
An Intrinsic Graphical 
Signature Based on Alert 
Correlation Analysis for 
Intrusion Detection[38]. 
N
ID
S 
-Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD): 
Examines  Ethernet header, IP header, TCP 
header, UDP header, and ICMP header [39]. 
- ADAM:  it uses a classiﬁcation technique to 
determine the exact nature of the remaining 
activity[40]. 
Kamran  and  Hussein  they 
present a signature extraction 
system that adaptively 
extracts signatures to the 
knowledge base[41]. 
Hy
br
id
 ID
S Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) and Network Traffic Anomaly 
Detection (NETAD) which are anomaly-based IDSs with the misuse-based IDS 
[42]. 
Table  2.5  Example from kind of intrusion detection systems 
Network AIDS monitors network traffic and contrasts it versus an established 
baseline of normal traffic profile. The Table  2.6 summarize the Shortcomings of current 
Intrusion Detection Systems. The SIDS has difficulties to deal with zero attack, signature 
update, and database size. However, The IDSs based on network have difficulties to deal with 
a large bandwidth, attack through application layer and encryption communication[43]. 
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Feature 
Intrusion Detection 
SIDS AIDS 
Host Network Host Network 
 
 
Configuration × × √ √ 
Zero Days attack  × × √ √ 
Signature update  × × √ √ 
Bandwidth  √ × √ × 
Database Sizes  × × √ √ 
Application Layer  √ 
 
× √ 
 
× 
Encrypted  √ × √ × 
Communication           × √ 
 
         × √ 
Targeted Attacks × √ × √ 
Table  2.6 Shortcomings of current intrusion detection systems 
√ means applicable according corresponding feature   while × means shortcomings 
of the particular systems 
2.5.3   Techniques used in anomaly detection 
Several techniques have been suggested for AIDSs to detect intrusions. The main methods 
are statistical techniques, knowledge based techniques and artificial intelligence (AI) based 
techniques as shown in Figure  2.2. AIDS involves three main tasks: training data set, 
detection model training and online detection. 
Machine learning techniques are utilized in intrusion detection to increase the 
performance of search and data analysis. Machine learning has helped researchers to solve 
many problems such as statistics and data mining.  A machine learning technique aims to 
develop IDS that increase its accuracy based on previous results.  Over the past few years, an 
increasing amount of research has applied data mining techniques to solve problems with 
intrusion detection.  
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Figure  2.2 Anomaly intrusion detection system techniques 
Researchers have used machine learning techniques for anomaly detection techniques 
as shown in Figure  2.2. The techniques of supervised and unsupervised learning can be used 
to solve several pattern recognition problems. Supervised learning is based on using the 
training data to create a model, in which each of the training data has a class label. The 
training stage is to build a classifier model. Once the model is built, it can categorize new 
instances based on a learned class label. A number of machine learning-based structures have 
been used with A-NIDS. Some of the most significant are explained below, and their main 
capabilities and problems are explained. 
Markov models: Markov chains have been used widely for anomaly detection. This 
is employee a random variable that changes through discrete points in time. Nong proposed 
an anomaly detection technique that is built from Markov chains [44]. In his model, the 
Markov chain model is used to act as a temporal profile of normal behavior in a computer 
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and network system. The Markov chain model of the normal profile is learned from pre- 
collected data of the system’s normal behavior. A hidden Markov model, another common 
Markov technique, is a statistical model where the system being modelled is assumed to be a 
Markov process with unknown parameters. 
Bayesian Networks: A Bayesian network is applied to model a domain having 
uncertainty. They have been widely used in AIDSs in different approaches. For example [45] 
developed an anomaly detection system that employed Naive Bayes. These models return an 
anomaly score or a probability value that represents the ‘normality’ of this event as stated by 
their current profiles. 
Genetic Algorithms (GA): have been employed in diverse ways in IDSs. The 
Applied Research Laboratories of the University of Texas at Austin [46] uses several 
machine learning methods, for example finite state machine, decision tree, and GA, to 
produce artificial intelligence rules for IDS, whereas others have used Genetic Algorithms for 
feature selection. 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN): ANN is a purely inspired method of distributed 
computation. It is comprised of component processing units, and the connections between 
them. [47] presented a hybrid neural network to differentiate normal behaviors from 
abnormal behaviors by the profile of “software behavior”. Also [48] used ANN-based IDS 
and fuzzy clustering to enhance the detection precision for low-frequency attacks and 
detection stability. 
Artificial immune system (AIS): An artificial immune system uses the processes of 
the human immune system and relates them to computational difficulties. [49] has used AIS 
to identify anomalous TCP/UDP connections made to machines on a network. 
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Statistical anomaly detection: In statistical approaches for AIDS, the system is 
looking for some traffic parameters, which can be used to define the network traffic and 
create profiles to be normal activities[50]. The profile normally contains some parameter 
such as activity intensity measure, Packet length, inter-arrival time, flow size, audit record 
distribution measure and categorical measures. For each parameter we usually consider mean 
value, variance, standard deviation, multivariate and so on.  Statistical methods for AIDS 
have some benefits. First, these methods do not need previous information of malicious 
activity. Consequently, this approach has the ability of detecting zero day attack. Second, it is 
able to provide an accurate alarm of unusual behavior. Nevertheless, statistical anomaly 
detection approach has some disadvantages. First, a malicious writer can write malicious 
codes acts as usual behavior. Second, it is difficult to define the appropriate threshold value 
for distinguishing between usual activity and unusual activity in network traffic [51]. 
2.5.4  Responses to Intrusion Detection System (RIDS) 
Intrusion prevention and intrusion detection systems have been suggested in a number of 
papers [52]. Nevertheless, response action needs to be the primary function against any 
potential attack, followed by the functionality of prevention and detection.  
The old-style of achieving a response was performing from the human intervention, 
who can extract an alarm or warning of danger from the IDS[52]. Then the security user 
analyses the logs and any detailed recorded event on the diverse computers that comprise the 
whole system in an effort to decide if the attack is presently active and what has been affected 
by it. Unfortunately, system administrators can neither keep up with the pace of the intrusion 
detection system nor can they react on these alerts within a reasonable time limit. Moreover, 
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these manual responses are not flexible and are not very efficient. These manual responses 
totally depend on the expertise of the system administrator. 
Automated response systems can take over the task which is required in case of many 
distributed systems to respond to an alert more quickly and accurately. Even though the 
intrusion response system component is often integrated with intrusion detection, it receives 
considerably less attention than intrusion detection research because of the complexity 
involved in developing and deploying responses in an automated fashion. 
In the current existing intrusion challenge, research has suggested that the response 
system should be an essential part of the instruction system[52]. Some researchers have 
proposed detection and response mechanisms to complement the existing prevention 
mechanism. In 2011, Elshoush et.al, declared the intrusion response as having a similar 
function to an IDS and was part of it by maintaining detection, and alerting and responding to 
the security operator [53]. A study of the literature has shown there is a weakness in 
providing an appropriate response to an intrusion detection system. 
Intrusion response system can be categorized according to the triggered response to 
passive and response attack. Passive response systems do not make an attempt to reduce 
damage already caused by the attack or prevent further attacks. They monitor and analyze 
network traffic activity and alert an operator to possible vulnerabilities and attacks. The main 
goal of passive response systems is to notify the organization or issue reports about attack 
information. An active response approach provides the IDS with an automatic response to an 
attack when it has been detected. The reason for that is to minimize the damage caused by the 
attacker by controlling user activity, such as restricting a user account; terminating the host; 
restarting  services and delaying suspicious system calls [30]. 
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Intrusion response systems can also be categorized according the level of automation 
in notification systems, manual response systems and automatic response systems. 
Notification systems present details regarding the attack which are then used to select the 
right response against attack. Existing IDSs offer notification response mechanisms. A 
manual response system provides a higher amount of automation than a notification system. 
Also, it permits the user security to select a suitable response in advance based on the 
recorded intrusion details. An automatic response system is a mechanism to select a response 
without human intervention. It supplies an instant reply to the intrusion through an automated 
decision making process. The key improvement of the automation response is decreasing the 
latency for response action from the time of detection. 
Moreover, Intrusion response systems can be categorized according to the response 
selection mechanism, static mapping and dynamic mapping. Static mapping systems are 
basically automated manual response systems that match an alert to an existing response. 
Static mapping response systems use decision tables to directly map a potential attack 
situation with an appropriate response. Such an approach is context independent as it fails to 
take into consideration the unique circumstances under which the attack was triggered. 
Dynamic response mapping systems are more advanced than static mapping systems as the 
response selection is based on the specific attack metrics (confidence, severity of attack, etc.).  
Taha. et al [54] analysed the alerts from one or more intrusion detection systems and 
present a compact summarized report and high-level view of tried intrusions which highly 
improves security effectiveness.  Sadoddin and Ghorbani [55], present an approach for real-
time alert correlation which integrates novel techniques for aggregating alerts into structured 
patterns and incremental mining of frequent structured patterns. 
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Up until recently, there have only been a few approaches that have implemented IDS 
to find anomalies in web applications using a SIDS and an AIDS. However, very few have 
used a combination of the two approaches [56]. Unfortunately none of them can guarantee a 
high level of security on web applications due to the web application architecture. Table  2.7 
provides a summary of the current research in developing an Intrusion detection system. This 
table is specifically describing IDSs as applied to web applications.  
Name Comments 
D
et
ec
tio
n 
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
R
es
po
ns
e 
 
Reducing errors in the anomaly-based 
detection of web-based attacks through 
the combined analysis of web requests 
and SQL queries [57] . 
 
Reduce FP and FN but doesn’t 
validate with Data Mining 
Algorithms. 
N
O
 
Y
ES
 
N
O
 
Protecting a Moving Target: 
Addressing Web Application Concept 
Drift[58]. 
Anomaly- based detection of changes 
in web application sate Y
ES
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
Anomaly Detection of Web-based 
Attacks [59]. 
Anomaly detection with parameter 
profiles associated with web 
applications (length and structure of 
parameters) from the analyzed data. 
Y
ES
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
Detecting and preventing attacks 
against web applications  [60]. 
Detection system that accurately 
detects attacks against web 
applications. 
Y
ES
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
Swaddler: An Approach for the 
Anomaly-Based Detection of State 
Violations in Web Applications[61]  
. 
Anomaly detection by learning the 
relationships between the 
application’s execution and the 
application’s internal sate. 
  
 Y
ES
 
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
WebIDS: A Cooperative Bayesian 
Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection 
System for Web Applications[62]. 
Learning-based anomaly detection 
system for Web applications Y
ES
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
Table  2.7  A summary of the research in developing an intrusion detection system 
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However, the focus of the research has been on the development of anomaly based 
detection. Several systems with AIDS capability have been proposed, such as SPADE [63], 
ADAM [64] and NIDES [65]. Kruegel and Vigna have proposed anomaly based techniques 
to study HTTP traffic at the network layer [66]. They applied different statistical measures to 
message characteristics such as request type, length, and the distribution of characters in the 
web application. Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson proposed an analysis of web servers to access 
logs and build multiple statistical models to characterize normal values of the parameters 
from web requests [62].  
2.6  Summary 
This chapter has reviewed various intrusion detection systems (IDS) techniques and their 
classification based on several approaches. As mentioned in this chapter, the central idea of 
anomaly detection is to build models of legitimate activities based on the normal data, and 
then any unusual actives from the normal model will be considered as an attack or anomaly. 
A broad study of several Anomaly based methods used in IDSs is reviewed. A number of 
studies of anomaly based techniques in IDS are discussed by considering classifier design 
and dataset. However, an effective Malware detection and prevention system must address 
three types of issues:  
Effectiveness and Precision: The Intrusion detection system should be able to discover 
attacks consistently with minimum false alarms. Therefore the IDS would be more successful 
if it has both a high intrusion detection rate and a low false alarm. It is extremely essential 
that the false alarm rate is low because in high traffic networks the quantity of false alarms 
could go above the total amount of attacks correctly detected, thus the intrusion detection 
system should identify all Malware with minimum false alarms. 
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Performance:  There are two main measures of IDS performance. Firstly, the False Positive 
Rate is the rate with which the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detect malicious activity by 
mistake.  In general, increasing the sensitivity of an intrusion-detection system results in a 
higher false positive rate, whereas decreasing the sensitivity results in a lower false positive 
rate. Secondly, the False Negative Rate is the rate at which the IDS wrongly identify 
malicious code when malicious activity actually occurs.  
Efficiency is often used to express the duration run-time of the Intrusion detection system 
that should be acceptable before any damage; preferably, making intrusion detection system 
in real time is very important. An advantage of IDS is that it can work in real time for 
continuous packet checking or can run in a batch mode for discrete analysis of packets.  In 
addition, how many computing resources such as CPU (Central Process Unit) time and 
memory space does it use, and so on.  
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Chapter 3 : Analysis of Crime Toolkits 
             
Cybercrime continues to evolve apace and its commercialisation and industrialisation based 
on the ready availability of crimeware toolkits presents challenges in the detection and 
prevention of malware. These crimeware toolkits, which required in-depth knowledge in both 
computer system and hardware, have common interest in targeting victims include 
individuals, business and financial institutions. Large scale attacks previously requiring 
months to set-up a botnet can now be scheduled for a small fee. Criminals are leveraging this 
opportunity of commercialisation, by compromising web applications and the user's browser, 
to gain advantages such as using the computer's resources for launching further attacks, or 
stealing data such as identifying information. Crimeware toolkits are being developed to 
attack an increasing number of applications and can now be deployed by attackers with little 
technical knowledge. In this chapter, we studied the methods that are used in crime toolkits. 
We present the development and current trend of crime toolkits and reveal the methods that 
have been used to commit cybercrime successfully. This chapter also analyses the current 
trends in crimeware toolkits. We profile the types of kits that malicious writers prefer, with a 
view to predicting future attack trends. We find that the scope for damage is increasing, 
particularly in specialisation and scale increase in cybercrime. This Chapter also provides 
widespread details about cybercrime losses by categorizing them into criminal revenue. 
Therefore, there is a collective consensus among defenders and policy makers that measures 
have to be taken to protect the online banking platforms from such threats. Although, many 
different technical controls and defense measures were taken by banking sector and security 
firms through increased supervision on transactions, yet the malware detection and 
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prevention exists as a big problem. The problem is that defense measures are mainly and 
most often reactive and thus accessible for intruders.  
3.1  Introduction 
The digital economy is presenting increased opportunity for legitimate industries, enabling 
the rapid uptake of technologies, while reducing the up-front infrastructure costs through 
technologies such as “Software-as-a-Service” (SaaS). Furthermore, platforms are being 
developed online that enable the immediate use of software on a subscription service, further 
allowing for the use of advancing technology. This is the productisation of complex pieces of 
software, packaged for non-technical end-users, often leading to increased uptake and higher 
profitability than selling stand-alone programs. Criminals are also leveraging this 
opportunity. 
In the previous Chapters, the problem of the current countermeasures has been 
introduced and we argued that after all improvements in defence measure by defenders, they 
still do not know how the attacks are selected by cybercriminals. 
As computer systems become more quickly developed and increasingly complex, 
vulnerabilities can be expected. These are often quickly identified by criminals with the aim 
of exploiting the systems for gain, such as using the computer's resources to launch other 
attacks or stealing information such as usernames, passwords and credit card numbers. A 
survey from Norton estimates that the total cost of cybercrime exceeds $US338 billion per 
year [67]. A recent report by the Australian Government warns that attacks will become 
increasingly likely and more prevalent [68]. The accessibility of criminal toolkits – one-click 
attacking software – means that criminals no longer need to be technologically savvy. A 
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person of low technical knowledge can now perform advanced internet based attacks with 
nothing more than a (potentially stolen) credit card and a web browser. 
After a web application is exploited, a number of problems arise. Firstly, if the 
exploited system can be used to obtain information from the database, private information 
such as credit card details can be downloaded. Secondly, the web application may provide a 
vector to attack more servers in the host's network. In a self-hosted environment, this may 
compromise the internal network of the company. In a shared-host environment, this may 
compromise the websites of other companies. Furthermore, the web application can also be 
used to infect the site's users with Malware through injecting code into the page. Much of this 
Malware takes advantage of web browser exploits, to install on the user's computer. This 
Malware can steal credit card details, passwords and online banking information. In all, a 
compromise of a web application can cause considerable damage to businesses [69]. 
In this chapter, we study crime toolkits and how they productise cybercrime. We 
survey some crime toolkits in section 3.2 before describing some attack vectors to web 
applications, one of the best methods for spreading Malware, in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we 
examine the most recent crime tool kits that target web applications, using Zeus as a case 
study. We summarise the chapter in section 3.5, highlighting some of the challenges faced by 
these advances. 
3.2  The Evolution of Malware Software Development Kits 
Many academic papers and Antivirus reports have been written about kits. Indeed, all have 
shown that there is significant growth in cybercrime, via sophisticated targeted techniques to 
fully take advantage of their victims. Such as; Flesta, MyPolySploit, Limbo2, Phonenix, and 
Eleonre.  Malware itself has a long history, with attacks occurring earlier than the 1980s. The 
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main driver behind these early attacks was often considered to be curiosity, aiming to answer 
the question “can we break into this system?” During the 1990s, internet crime started 
becoming more malicious, with the question moving towards “what can we get from this 
system?” In more recent years, the mass organization of cybercrime, and the proliferation of 
automated techniques has instead changed the question to “how can be maximize our return 
on investment?” Cybercrime today is about money and criminals are becoming increasingly 
organized, both in attacks and also fiscal management [70]. 
In Table  3.1, an overview of the evolution of Malware from the 1980s to present is 
presented. As time progresses, so too does the complexity, sophistication, malice and 
automation of Malware. 
Features 1980 decade 1990 decade 2000 
decade 
Present 
Spread way Floppy disk Floppy disk, Email, 
same network 
Email  Drive by downloads  
Users  become 
victim  
Insert disk Open email Open 
Email  
Browser  web site 
Examples Brain Morris 
Worm 
Vandoies Code Red Zeus 
Detection  
mechanism 
SIDS SIDS, Email filter SIDS SIDS, AIDS, web 
protection 
Table  3.1 Attack development 
Writing effective Malware is a difficult task, requiring a high level of knowledge 
about computer systems. This is means the attackers and Malware writers have historically 
been highly skilled technically. However it quickly became obvious to many that Malware 
could be sold rather than used. This reduced the risks for authors, as the difficulty and risk in 
attacks is not stealing credentials, but converting them into cash. Furthermore, the 
organizations built around cybercrime, often leveraging more traditional organized crime 
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networks, mean that people have become specialized and whole teams are now dedicated to 
developing Malware. As an example of this productisation, the developers of the “Blackhole” 
toolkit sell a subscription to their Malware, enabling customers to gain the newest features as 
they are developed. This mirrors the subscription model employed by an increasing number 
of software companies in the legitimate digital economy. 
Crime toolkits expose a widespread number of attack vectors. Further, different 
toolkits employ different exploits and techniques. Much of this variation comes from the 
diverse origins, skills, and goals of the authors. Table  3.2 outlines some of the features and 
techniques used by present day Malware. Some features consistently appear such as phishing 
and keystroke logging. These are often the “normal” actions performed by Malware. Other 
features, such as the ability to take screenshots, are becoming more common as websites 
implement methods to overcome basic key loggers (such as visual passwords or on-screen 
keyboards). Web injection features are used to create fake pop-up menus, usually a small 
window that suddenly appears in the victim’s browser. Online service features allow naïve 
customers, who do not have any technical background, to ask help via instant messages or 
emails on how to install, customize and update the malware. Real time capability offers the 
ability to monitor the attacks in real time for the infected devices. The attacks are automated 
and do not need any manual intervention from the attacker. Finally, the encryption is used to 
hide the presence of the malware. 
Crime toolkits are developing at a fast rate, with new features added regularly. 
Table  3.2 details the features of some of the more prolific Malware types. There has been a 
clear transition from using phishing emails towards directly modifying banking webpages 
using JavaScript and HTML injected straight into the webpage (although phishing is still 
occurring at a high rate). 
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Malware is also targeting the DNS systems of infected PCs, redirecting an affected 
user to a malicious webpage, even when they input the correct URL. One example of this is 
DNS Changer, which modifies the client's DNS server settings to an illegitimate DNS server 
controlled by the attacker[71]. The evolution of Malware has led to an increased realization of 
the threats posed to web applications. In the next section, we show how the Malware threats 
identified in this section can be leveraged to attack web applications in a number of ways. 
 
 
 
Malware 
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Zeus  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SpyEye ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
InfoStear ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Silent Banker ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
URL Zone ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Carberp ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Haxdoor ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓     ✓ 
Limbo ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓     ✓ 
Table  3.2 Crime tool kits characteristics 
 
Name Year of 
Appearance 
Explanation  
Zeus 2007 Uses traditional e-mail phishing methods to infect Internet  
users. 
Limbo 2007 Steals sensitive data. Has ability  to inject users web page 
Zeus 2.0 2010 Contains the aptitude to overcome the uninstall routine. Novel 
abilities, containing events to simplify several installations on 
similar PC. 
SpyEye 2010 Web browser observer and Sniffing of network protocol such 
as HTTP, FTP and POP. 
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InfoStear 2009 Has a very specific payload goal. Has ability to collect 
confidential information from the victim and redirects them to 
a predetermined web site.  
Silent 
Banker 
 Exists by users clicking links on a malicious link. 
URL Zone 2009 Modifies bank pages to trick victims into transferring funds 
Haxdoor 2011 Redirects the infected user’s URL connection requests. 
Carberp 2012 Carberp has the functionality to use both general and targeted 
attacks. It also has new abilities, making it stronger than Zeus. 
Cridex 2012 embedded URL links or HTML attachments that tricked the 
user to browse to the compromised Web sites 
Table  3.3  Crime toolkits explanation 
3.3  Exploit Crimeware Toolkits 
An exploit crimeware toolkit is a malicious software package, usable by beginners or experts 
that make the attacks easier. The attacker input the malicious code allowing for ease of use 
and accessibility. These types of attacks can target a number of systems, but often focus on 
common software applications such as Adobe Acrobat, Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet 
Explorer. 
There are different crime toolkits, with different functionality and capability. We listed 
some examples previously in Table  3.3, but they can be categorized broadly into two main 
components: exploit toolkits and C&C servers. Exploits toolkits are increasingly common, 
containing exploits and common tools necessary to perform attacks. These are often 
standalone programs, designed to be run from a single computer. 
The ease of use and accessibility of these toolkits is gaining popularity in recent years, 
opening the door to more cybercriminals than previously possible. Those that lack the 
expertise to develop attacks are no longer left out, able to purchase the software to perform 
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these attacks for them. The main feature that differentiates recent Malware from earlier 
generations is the degree of customization available. Customising Malware is now an 
important aspect, most notably to ensure that there is sufficient difference from previous 
incarnations of a Malware sample to avoid IPS devices and anti-virus programs. Further, 
custom Malware can be ordered, targeting a specific entity the purchaser is interested in. This 
is much like the recent Stuxnet virus, developed to target a specific type of computing device. 
Current Malware differentiates most from earlier generations through the degree of 
customization now available. Custom coding of attacks and features is possible, purchasable 
from a technical cybercrime expert for a few thousand dollars. 
Many toolkits are based in the cloud, utilizing a C&C infrastructure with a botnet to 
perform attacks at a much larger scale than is possible from a single computer. These botnets 
can be rented for a low cost and provide access to a very large amount of computing power. 
Combined with preconfigured attack profiles, botnets with C&C based toolkits are very 
dangerous. 
Exploit kits are vulnerability exploits, which enable cybercrime to install malicious 
binaries on a victim’s computer. Vulnerabilities are a serious threat to individuals and 
organizations. However, Botnet kits complement Exploit kits and they are being used to 
facilitate the crime for the criminals through the command and control servers.  
Malicious authors are simplify the attack process so that even beginner cybercriminals 
can successfully lunch malicious code attacks, in addition, pay per install (PPI) services are 
also available for renting and reselling bots, which emerged rapid creation of new botnets. The 
botnets are totally independent from the botmaster which makes the footprint harder to trace 
back.  
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Cybercriminals exploit server side vulnerabilities and inject hidden frames that point to 
malicious pages, and then they trigger an attack by tricking the computer users to click on the 
links to install their malicious binaries maybe by sending spam emails with malicious links or 
attachments.  
Most aspects of the attack kits use friendly user interface. These kits are of web-based 
design, mainly implemented in common scripting languages like PHP. Cybercrimes 
developers provide an administrative panel for setting up and monitoring all the activities, 
including configuration settings, location of bot clients, scheduled attacks, and activity logs 
providing a range of attack statistics. 
The main uses for exploit kits are to install malicious binaries for mainly financial 
gain. The main purposes of these malicious binaries are stealing sensitive information to be 
sold or used later, using the infected victim for sending spam, and installing other malicious 
binaries like fake anti-virus where profits can be earned from every “registrations”.  
Cybercriminals create an exploit kit by collecting a number of known vulnerabilities 
which are publicly available, like: 
-  Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SoftwareRegistration.do (CVE-2012-
2172). 
- Java trusted Methods Chaining Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-
0840).  
- Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 WMI Object Broker Remote Code Execution 
Vulnerability (CVE-2006-4704). 
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-PDF exploits for vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, namely Adobe Reader 
CollectEmailInfo (CVE-2007-5659), Adobe Reader util.printf (CVE-2008-2992), Adobe 
Reader Collab GetIcon (CVE-2009-0927), doc.media.newPlayer (CVE-2009-4324), and 
LibTIFF integer overflow (CVE-2010-0188). 
- Adobe's Flash Player is also targeted via exploits for two integer overflow 
vulnerabilities, one in the AVM2 abcFile parser (CVE-2009-1869) and one in another 
component (CVE-2007-0071). 
- The Windows Help and Support Center protocol handler vulnerability (CVE-2010-
1885). 
- Internet Explorer flaws, a IEPeers remote code execution (CVE-2009-0806) and a 
recursive CSS import vulnerability (CVE-2010-3971). 
3.4  Components of attacks 
As shown in the previous section, crime toolkits like Exploit kits and botnet situation are very 
serious and growing as cybercriminals continue to create new methods for developing and 
distributing malicious binaries. The situation is most likely to escalate even further. The 
cybercriminal game is as many people as possible for financial gain. The exploit kits have 
proven to be an effective channel to infect users.  Cybercriminals are using various techniques 
in order to avoid antivirus detection like applying obfuscation to binaries; on one hand, most 
of them don’t show suspicious behaviors, so antivirus companies have to focus on signatures 
to deal with those programs. 
Many crime toolkits are continuously developed, updating to change in demand within 
the underground market [72]. Attack kits have facilitated this to accelerate the process by 
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which a new exploit spreads, increasing the potential for damage. This is possible, in part, by 
various innovations that toolkit developers have integrated into their products. 
Current attacks chose an increasing level of complexity, with a combination of spam 
and social engineering attacks used to produce high levels of effectiveness and efficiency. This 
maximises the profitability of attacks and toolkits. Further, toolkits are highly customisable, 
and can have additional components added. These components include command-and-control 
(C&C) infrastructure; exploit libraries browser detection, improved user interfaces and many 
more. They can also include programs to automatically generate scripts to inject into pages to 
steal identity information. Most toolkits are developed in PHP, showing the use of more 
modern development styles, as opposed to the traditional view of hackers using low level 
languages such as C or Assembly. Further, PHP is easier to run on many operating systems, 
with web servers such as Apache available on most operating systems. This reduces the 
complexity of installation on new servers. The following sub sections show the most popular 
comments among crime tool kits.  
3.4.1  Exploit Libraries 
Crime toolkits use exploits to attack, and therefore exploit libraries are important features of 
modern crime toolkits. The scope of these libraries depends on the toolkit itself and the 
effectiveness is dependent on the quality of the developers. Older attacks are less likely to 
work, forcing constant updating of these exploit libraries (consequently giving the attackers a 
business model for ongoing subscriptions). Modern toolkits can be updated like any modern 
application, both adding new exploits and improving older ones when detection engines “catch 
up” and block attacks. Malicious writers are frequently updating the exploit code, supplying 
new attacks to compromise victims. 
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3.4.2  JavaScript and Injects 
The primary way to attack a user's web experience and gain information from 
webpages is to inject pages with JavaScript or other code. These injects are given in crime 
toolkits and then injects while the user views different webpages [73]. Zeus and SpyEye are 
examples of toolkits that make heavy use of injects for stealing information, and have a high 
level of configuration, allowing for the use of specific injects against different targets [74]. 
They are also updated as the attacked website changes to deal with the threat. 
Attackers can add HTML code into pages after it has completed loading, increasing the 
difficultly of detecting changes to the page, as this happens after the “initial” JavaScript has 
loaded. Further, webpages can be copied and the information sent somewhere else, rather than 
the real site. This can be done automatically for high-profile targets. 
3.4.3  ATS (Automatic Transfer System): 
The new method, known as automatic transfer system (ATS), is being used in combination 
with common crimeware kits to launch attacks through web browsers, which can bypass 
online banking security protection. Trend Micro researchers revealed how two popular 
crimeware kits, Zeus and SpyEye, used this feature to silently transfer money from one 
account to another [75]. 
Earlier styles of crimeware captured account authorisations via web injects on the web 
page for the duration of a victim’s browsing session. Clients could insert extra information in 
these fields, such as identification numbers and password, not realizing that it was not the 
bank requesting the data. With the data gathered, an attacker may possibly login independently 
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to steal money from the client. However, the crime tool kits using ATS techniques remain 
unseen, because they do not request pop-up windows. 
3.4.4  Browser Detection Engine 
 
This assists the attacker in identifying which exploits will be used by the crime toolkit. The 
browser detector helps to detect the vulnerability of Internet users. 
3.4.5  Command-and-control Servers 
The main functionality of a command-and-control server is to control the successfully 
compromised users. Once the botnet is successfully installed, the controller of a botnet is 
capable of directing the activities of these compromised computers to obtain critical 
information.  
3.4.6  User Interface 
Most crime toolkits provide an administrative panel as a graphical user interface for watching 
all victim activity, simplifying configuration settings, determining the botnet, and arranging 
attacks. 
3.4.7  Updatability Mechanisms 
Most of the attacks from crime toolkits permit updates with a new version of kit components. 
These features enable the crime toolkit user to use the new arsenal. 
3.4.8  Obfuscation Techniques 
The term obfuscation means changing the program code that makes the code harder to 
understand [72]. There is a range of different obfuscation techniques employed by attack kit 
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developers and users to evade detection and increase the survivability of their toolkits.  Code 
obfuscation is successfully used by Malware writers to avoid antivirus detection. 
3.4.9  Web Injection 
A web injection attack is a recent method used by the exploit toolkit to compromise a victim 
through phishing attacks [76]. The purpose of a web injection attack is to inject and perform 
instructions identified by the attacker in the web page. It is usually supplementary with Zeus 
and SpyEye toolkits. 
The writer of the exploit toolkit, who desires to use the web injection utility of Zeus 
and SpyEye toolkits, attaches a file for that purpose when generating the Malware with the 
builder component  [72]. For instance, a hacker can add malicious HTML code to an injected 
website page after the page has completed loading. However, many crime toolkits have the 
functionality of HTML injection capability. The attacker can modify these crime toolkits to 
create a fake website with a new additional field. The fake injected website appears like the 
original website to a user’s web browsers.  
A web injection file is mostly a script file from JavaScript and a HTML tag. This file 
allows cybercriminals to attack any particular organization, such as a bank. This is done by 
injecting specific code into victims’ browsers so they can change the web pages that the user 
accesses in real time. Web injection file users can simply create fake pop-ups, as a small 
window that appears in the forefront of a victim’s web browser. Pop-ups can be launched by 
a single or double mouse click that requests extra information such as identification number, 
PIN number, password, and user name. Web injection files have all of the script required to 
trick victims into considering the pop-ups are real. These use HTML scripts to make web 
pages look original using different parameters. 
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3.5  Attack Vectors for Web Applications 
Modern web applications are built on a complex stack of software, making it no surprise that 
they contain vulnerabilities. Web applications suffer from a number of attack vectors, causing 
serious problems such as financial fraud and stolen personally identifying information. A large 
portion of the protocols that constitute the “internet” as it is commonly used were not designed 
with security in mind. As any change towards secure protocols is slow, the consequences of 
these design decisions now impact on the digital economy, undermining the trustworthiness of 
business online. 
Attackers can leverage trusted web applications to target both the information they 
store and their users. A lack of understanding about encryption and security can lead to an 
over-confidence by users to overly trust web applications. As an example, Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) can be used to encrypt the communications between a web application and the 
client, but do not state anything about the security of the web application itself. 
Many web applications suffer from a number of vulnerabilities, including those that 
are not commonly found in traditional computer applications. Examples include SQL Injection 
attacks, Cross site scripting (XSS) and Remote File Execution. Due to the rapid pace of 
innovation on the web, securing against these types of attacks is often left until after an attack 
happens and information is breached. Many large websites have suffered from massive 
security breaches that would have been prevented if best-practice security measures were 
implemented in the original design of the website. For example, LinkedIn suffered a data 
breach in 2012, leading to the exposure of hashed passwords from the database. These hashes 
were not salted, leading to the ability to use rainbow tables to crack the passwords. Features 
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are often the major selling point for a web application, leading to a lack of focus on costs such 
as security. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) released a report on the ten 
most critical risks for web applications. In the rest of this section, we present the damaging 
vulnerabilities as mentioned by OWASP. 
3.5.1  Cross-site Scripting (XSS) 
A relatively recent attack leverages session IDs through JavaScript on other websites. Called 
cross-site scripting, XSS, a JavaScript function is called on any page that injects code into a 
different page, such as online banking or email. This allows for arbitrary code execution on a 
different site, hijacking a user's session and can then be used to steal cookies. This would 
allow an attacker to replicate a user's session on another machine. 
3.5.2  SQL Injection Attacks 
Web applications often need to construct queries to a database dynamically as part of 
normal execution. As an example, we can check if a user has entered the correct password 
using a query such as: SELECT username FROM user_table WHERE username=”?” AND 
password=”?”; 
The question marks (?) in the above query are replaced with the username and 
password entered by the user, respectively. As an example, if the username is Mark and the 
password is hunter2, the query will be built to equal: SELECT username FROM user_table 
WHERE username=”Mark” AND password=”hunter2”; 
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This query should return the username if, and only if the username and password 
combination exists in the database. However, if the user enters the password “OR 1=1; --, the 
query will become: SELECT username FROM user_table WHERE username=”Mark” AND 
password=”” OR 1=1; --”; 
In this example the quote character from the malicious password is interpreted as part 
of the SQL query and the last two conditions, password=”” OR 1=1, evaluate to true, allowing 
the query to return the username. The system will then think that login was successful and 
allow access even without the correct password. 
Effective techniques exist to stop this type of attack, but require added effort on the 
part of the software developer. The most effective method is to sanities input, which involves 
escaping characters so that the database does not interpret them literally. In the above 
example, the malicious password “OR 1=1; --, would be escaped to \” OR 1=1; --. The 
database will then interpret the first quote character (“) to be part of the password, and not part 
of the query [77]. This type of sanitization occurs in every major database interface in most 
programming languages. 
Ineffective techniques also exist that attempt to stop this kind of attack. One example is 
for the web application to check that no special characters exist in the password before 
sending it onto the server. While this works for normal usage of the application, a savvy 
attacker can bypass these checks (the easiest way is to turn off JavaScript or create a customer 
interface to the server) and send the malicious password to the server. Instead, all input from 
users should be interpreted as being insecure by the browser and sanitized. 
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3.5.3  Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
This type of attack takes advantage of a lack of authorization in some poorly designed web 
applications. The attacker first gets the user to run their script (either through a malicious link 
or by injecting it into another web application) and uses their saved credentials for one site to 
perform malicious commands without the user's knowledge. This is performed by injecting 
network requests via the user's browser. The browser's security procedure permits web sites to 
show HTTP requests to any network address[78]. 
3.5.4  Other Vulnerabilities 
As well as web-based vulnerabilities, web applications also suffer from vulnerabilities from 
other non-web based applications. These include buffer overflow attacks, in which an overly 
long input is given designed to cause the program to execute malicious commands stored in 
memory, and security misconfigurations, in which security settings are poorly designed 
allowing for access around other safeguards. An example of this is not setting file permissions, 
allowing for file system access from the internet. 
3.5.5  Drive by Downloads 
The goal of attacking web applications is to infect the visitors and to gain resources for 
attacking. For infecting visitors, the most effective method is drive by downloading, in which 
a file is downloaded to the user's computer while they are visiting a site, and without them 
actually doing anything to instigate the download. This contrasts with the historic view of 
user's infecting themselves through naivety or risky behaviour. Drive by downloads are rare, 
as most exploits used to instigate them are patched very quickly after being discovered. These 
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exploits do appear from time to time, and constitute one of the more dangerous attack vectors 
for infecting users. 
The efficiency of these attacks is led by a number of factors. First, weaknesses in web 
applications are prevalent [79] and vulnerable web applications are frequently used. Secondly, 
crime toolkits are available that exploit these weaknesses in underground forums. Third, 
highly skilled technicians write the code and spread it to internet users, though avenues such 
as NeoSploit and LuckySploit [67]. 
3.6  Case Study on Zeus 
Zeus is one of the more modern, sophisticated and dominant crime toolkits available today. 
The Zeus toolkit is easy to use and designed to steal user's Internet banking account 
information and any other critical information from a user's computer. Further to this, the 
toolkit has a number of different functions and attacks. In this section, we review how Zeus 
can be productised cybercrime on the web application. 
3.6.1  Building a Bot  
Zeus has a utility for building executables for infecting devices, turning them into “bots”. The 
main purpose of this “builder” utility is to create an encrypted dynamic configuration file and 
a bot executable file. The dynamic configuration is downloaded by the bot after it infects a 
user's computer. The purpose of this configuration file is to inform the bot what code to inject 
into different webpages, what other tasks to perform and how to connect to the botnet. The 
C&C server will ensure the file is up to date, allowing for improvements to be made in 
response to countermeasures or bugs in the coding. The first step is that the builder examines 
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whether there is a version of Zeus bot that already has a computer victim, if it is found it gives 
the Zeus user the ability to remove the spyware from the computer as shown in Figure  3.1. 
 
 
Figure  3.1 Zeus builder 
In the second step, the encrypted file is created using the “Build config” button. Also 
editing config is also available as shown in Figure  3.2. 
 
Figure  3.2 Encryption file 
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In the third step, the botnet is generated. The botnet has different encryption settings 
and different file statistics, aiming to bypass countermeasures such as anti-virus. Figure  3.3 
displays the output details. These features of various botnet are making antivirus vendor very 
hard to detect them [80]. 
 
Figure  3.3 Zeus builder details 
                                     
The “Edit Config” file allows for changes, such as the following: 
 timer_logs: Time interval to upload the logs to server 
 timer_stats: Time interval to upload infection statistics to server 
 url_config: Server URL for fetching the config file 
 url_compip: Server URL for reporting the victim 
 encryption_key: to encode config file in such a way that anti detection cannot detect it 
 url_loader: URL for fetching latest version of the zeus.exe 
 url_server: Command and control server 
 file_webinjects: contain HTML code for web injection purpose 
 AdvancedConfigs: feature for advance config such as backup feature. 
 WebFilters: store the list of URLs that should be watched for stealing login user name 
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and password. 
 WebDataFilters: Contains the list of URLs that should be monitored for specific string 
matches.  
 WebFakes: contains URLS  fake website  
The configuration file stores the IP address for the bot will receive data from. Once the 
executable file has been done, the attacker installs it to different computers. The controller of 
the botnet is a file that contains scripts for attacks and deployment. The controller can trace 
their bots and download stolen data and optional to write report to database as shown in 
Figure  3.4. This is all nicely formatted using PHP scripts with an easy to use GUI. 
Once Zeus is successfully installed on a victim machine, it connects with the C&C 
server via a HTTP GET request in order to retrieve the configuration file. The server responds 
with the file and the bot updates itself. As mentioned earlier, the frequency of this updating 
can be configured, as can the C&C server locations. 
In Zeus, the communication between bot and C&C is performed using HTTP, as 
opposed to previous botnets which used IRC or P2P protocols. The data is encrypted with an 
RC4 encryption algorithm and key provided by the botmaster [81]. Earlier versions had a 
vulnerability allowing for automated key extraction, but subsequent versions have been 
updated to address this vulnerability [82]. 
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Figure  3.4 Zeus control panel 
3.6.2  Zeus Webpage Injection 
Zeus has the capability to inject web pages dynamically. The holder of Zeus can inject any 
data they want into webpages, such as additional fields in online banking that request ATM 
pins and social security numbers. The following screenshot shows a typical item from the 
WebInjects section. A WebInject file is mostly a text file with a code of JavaScript and HTML 
code. This file allow attacker to target specific organizations such as financial institute and 
inject internet users browsers so they can redirect the user’s web page. Using WebInject file 
can simply fake requests to users for critical information. WebInject files have all of the code 
essential to fool victims into thinking the pop-ups they see are real. Figure  3.5 displays a login 
page before and after injection. 
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Figure  3.5  Login page before and after injection 
3.7  Crime Toolkits Trends: 
In this section we discuss crime toolkits trends. The damage of attack and impact with new 
crime toolkits would be increased with the new crime tool kits. The development of new 
crime toolkits are extremely targeted and organized by cybercriminals. Figure  3.6 shows the 
crime toolkit trends. 
 
Figure  3.6  Crime toolkits trends 
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Advances from targeted attacks will create their way into massive attacks as shown in 
Figure  3.6. Malicious writers have used methods to evade detection systems and create many 
forms of threats with the new style. They have moved gradually to the next generation of 
cybercrime and exploited vulnerabilities in other applications. This new generation of 
cybercrime has a high degree of stealth over a long duration of operation in order to be 
effective, and compromised computer systems remain to be of service even after key systems 
have been penetrated and original goals achieved [83].  It also capitalizes on organizational 
data available on social networking sites to create 'phishing' emails and malware targeted at 
the types of applications and operating systems (with all their vulnerabilities) typical in 
particular industries. 
Figure  3.7 shows the comparison between traditional crime toolkits versus advanced crime 
toolkits. Advanced toolkits are persistent, stealthy, target and zero days. Crime toolkits are 
becoming gradually more complex due to many reasons. There are notably more kinds of 
malware being created in the wild that exploit zero-day vulnerabilities. Crime toolkits have 
also now been created with polymorphic and stealthy abilities. The polymorphic feature 
changes certain characteristics of malware for each time of infection. Also, the crime toolkits 
are now easy to update, which permits a malicious writer to speedily insert codes for new 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure  3.7 Traditional crime toolkits versus advance toolkits 
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3.8  Conclusions 
Crime toolkits have been rooted in cybercriminal corporations for a long time and have been 
continuously developed and enhanced. Cybercrime is now a sellable product, with easy to use 
GUIs and a target audience including non-technical attackers. The large number of crime 
toolkits is increasing in sophistication and profitability. New Malware can be created by non-
technical attackers, increasing largely the potential number of attackers. Further, the 
specialisation of roles has led to increased complexity and quality in Malware. This increase 
in complexity and usability means that the threat is more pronounced than it ever has been, 
and the automation behind the attacks is increasing the scale of application. Having 
investigated these crime toolkits, we make the safe prediction that this complexity will rise in 
the future, although ironically, so too will the usability and front-end simplification of attacks. 
As polymorphic variations increase in complexity, signature based anti-virus is not adequate. 
Alternatives, such as behavioural analysis or whitelists, are important and increasingly 
necessary countermeasures. 
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Chapter 4 : Hybrid Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention Architecture 
             
In this chapter we propose a Hybrid Intrusion Detection and Prevention Architecture that 
combines the Signature Intrusion Detection System and an Anomaly Intrusion Detection 
System.  Hybrid Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems get the signatures keywords 
from the output of AIDS and add them into the signature database. Also, the combination of 
SIDS and AIDS has been connected with a response action using fuzzy logic. We used a risk 
assessment approach to determine an appropriate response action against each attack event. 
After evaluating the new system, a better result was generated in line with detection 
efficiency and the false-alarm rate. This demonstrates the value of direct response action in 
an intrusion detection system and makes the detection and prevention more effective. 
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4.1  Introduction: 
To mitigate attacks in web applications and computer networks, an approach to detect and 
prevent the attacks is required. As shown earlier, most existing approaches focus on how to 
prevent an attack at the web application layer, with less work dedicated to setting up a 
response action when the attack has happened. Cybercriminal who achieve unauthorized 
access to financial systems cause huge losses to the financial sector, and currently there is no 
single technique that can stop them as we discussed on chapter 3. However, a threat that was 
once utilized by individual criminals is now the focus of major organised crime crossing 
international boundaries and jurisdictions. Generally, an attacker develops new and 
sophisticated techniques to target and hack the web application. The result is that the 
attackers gain access to the data of other users.  
However, Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the most essential elements used 
to detect the malicious attack. SIDS has a good capability to detect a previously known attack 
while AIDS has a good capability to detect a novel attack by using data mining techniques.  
Initially, intrusion detection techniques mostly relied on matching to signature patterns of 
well-known malware for triggering a detection decision.   The new arsenal of crime tool kits 
such as Zeus and SpyEye [84], require an Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
system (IIDPS) with capability of a response action as discussed in chapter 2. Although 
researchers have proposed many IDS, research efforts in IDS and response actions are still 
not connected to each other [85]. 
However, most current intrusion response systems  use static corresponding matching 
to decide a suitable response action in reaction to any possible attack [52]. The problem with 
this approach is its inability to take into account the current state of the entire system. In static 
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mapping systems the generated response actions represent separate models to reduce attacks 
without taking the particular state of attack and the effect on the system into account. Thus a 
new mechanism is needed that links the state of an attack with a suitable response technique. 
This allows the Intrusion Response System (IRS) to select a suitable reply among a number 
of possible responses which achieves high level security. 
We design and implement an IIDPS framework that combines the SIDS, AIDS and 
response action. We present a technique to select the best response against an intrusion. Our 
IIDPS framework is flexible to accommodate different web application architectures. The 
communication between the SIDS, AIDS and the intrusion response component are based on 
the web application architecture. The main motivations to develop an IIDPS at the web 
application tier with a response action are: I) the malware that targets a database server may 
not be detected at the network level [19]; II) the intrusion detection system that is designed at 
the network level is not satisfactory to protect database layers against insider threats [85]; III) 
Individually, SIDS and AIDS do not provide enough security [84]; IV) It is necessary to 
mitigate the attacks with an appropriate response to an intrusion detection system [52].  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the background and related 
work, Section 4.3 describes our model, Section 4.4 presents the performance and 
performance evaluation and Section 4.5 provides the conclusion. 
4.2  Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention System 
(IIDPS) 
Traditional IDS have restrictions; including low flexibility, inability to distinguish novel 
attacks, high cost, slow updates and a lack of extensibility.  It also shows that both SIDS and 
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AIDS have drawbacks such as low detection zero-day attack. The aim of the new approach is 
design and develops an effective IIDPS that address the weakness of SIDS and AIDS. Our 
IIDPS combines SIDS, AIDS and RIDS to become an IIDPS. Figure  4.1 shows an overview 
of the proposed Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention System. In our system, AIDS 
help to detect unknown attacks, while SIDS detects known attacks. The basic idea of the new 
system is to take benefits from both SIDS and AIDS to create effective IDS. The IIDPS has 
three stages; the SIDS stage, the AIDS stage and the response action stage as shown in 
Figure  4.1. 
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Figure  4.1 Overview of our IIDPS and response action model 
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4.2.1  SIDS Stage 
The SIDS stage simply uses pattern matching to handle the received request from clients. 
Whether or not this request is legitimate or illegitimate, SIDS will detect a known malicious 
string attack that has been previously stored in the SIDS signature database. If the request is 
passed to the final stage has the same pattern as found on the malicious string database, it 
means the request will be identified on the system as a true attack. As a consequence, 
response action is taking the appropriate response action. Otherwise, if the received request is 
not found in the malicious string, the AIDS stage handles the request. 
Throughout the signature-matching stage, SIDS examines the contents of a user 
request, checking for the occurrence of well-known Intrusion. In SIDS, each signature is 
specified by a rule that identified a known attack. If user’s request is identified as malicious 
request, followed by the action identified by the rule related with that signature is taken. This 
action is raise an alarm and some response action against an attack such as no action, Alarm, 
hold, Abort and disconnect. 
It is very important for the IDS to be effective; that is, it should detect a large amount 
of attack; while still maintaining the false positive.  Thus, the good IDS should not generate 
false positive too much. Reduction of False positives can be achieved when all malware 
signatures are stored in the database as shown in Figure  4.2 . The false positive rate is 
calculated as the following formula. 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑡 𝑃𝑙𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑎 𝑙𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑓
𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑎 𝑙𝑓 𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑓  
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Figure  4.2 The relation between FP and Malware signature stored in the DB. 
 Also Increase true positive, number of detection malware by increase the number of 
malware that stored in the database as in Figure  4.3. 
 
Figure  4.3 The relation between TP and detection of unkown Malware 
However, Specific signature is hardly to generate any false positives as shown in 
Figure  4.4 , as the specific signature is always looking for a specific signature. However, the 
specific Signature has a weakness to detect new and unknown malware. Generic Signature is 
more likely for generating false positive, and more opportunity to detect unknown malware. 
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The chapter 6 describes in details how the AIDS stage can generate automated signatures of 
attack.  
 
Figure  4.4 The relation between FP and detection of unknown Malware accrording the type 
of signature 
 
4.2.2  AIDS stage 
The second stage is the AIDS stage. The main idea of this stage is to overcome the shortfalls 
of the SIDS stage. The main assumption is that any request received from users is an anomaly 
request, unless proven otherwise. In the AIDS stage, the system builds the profile of users by 
using data that is accepted as normal behaviour. Then it monitors the activities of new users 
and compares the new data with the obtained profile and tries to detect deviations. 
In this stage, the system gathers information from the user request such as request 
length, character distribution and particular token, and if any suspicious event is detected, the 
system will store it in the signature database. The reason from the store signature in the 
database is taking precautions against the new attack in future requests. This is will discuss in 
details in Chapter 6 Multi stage Rules for Malware Prevention System.  
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 Once the users profile has been built, the system can decide if the user activity is a 
normal or abnormal behaviour.  The profile information collected from the users’ activities 
by using the learning mode enables identification of the appropriate response to any attack, as 
shown at the bottom of Figure  4.1. One of the primary components of AIDS is a feature 
selection. The purpose from feature selection to recognize a significant feature for creating 
IDS that is more effective to detect several kind of attack. The chapter 5 is discussed the 
details for this stage. 
4.2.3  Response Action Stage 
The ability to react quickly to attack is the key component and most needed part of Malware 
detection and prevention system.  The final element of our approach is taking appropriate 
response actions against a request if it is found to be an anomaly. A response action is a set of 
instructions that is carried out for a given attack. Response actions are triggered by the 
response action policy in reply to an attack which is detected by SIDS or AIDS.  Once SIDS 
and AIDS detect an attack then this stage reacts with an attack. The Response Action has two 
stages, risk assessment stage and response reaction stage.  
4.2.3.1  Risk Assessment  
The main purpose for risk assessment is to estimate the risk level of an attack. We have 
adopted the DREAD model from Microsoft to help calculate risk and rate the threats [86].  
By using the DREAD model, it is possible to arrive at the risk rating for a given threat by 
asking the following questions: 
• Damage potential: How great is the damage if the vulnerability is exploited? 
• Reproducibility: How easy is it to reproduce the attack? 
• Exploitability: How easy is it to launch an attack? 
• Affected users: As a rough percentage, how many users are affected? 
   89 
 
• Discoverability: How easy is it to find the vulnerability? 
 
We applied the DREAD risk assessment to identify the risk level for an application 
attack[87]. The risk matrix is used in the risk assessment process. These matrices provide a 
qualitative risk ranking that classifies the degree from very high to very low. The probability 
of risk ranges from zero to one. The threat impact can be classified in five states as shown in 
the following sets and Table  4.1 :  
Probability of Risk= {Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High} 
Impact of Risk= {Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High} 
Probability Description 
Very high Expected to occur with almost certainty 
High Expected to occur 
Medium Likely occur 
Low Very unlikely to occur 
Very low Almost no possibility of occurring 
Table  4.1  Standard term for severity quantification 
Risk exposure measures the whole threat of the risk, with the possibility of actual loss 
(probability) with the amount of the likely loss (impact) into a single numeric value using the 
following equations 
Risk =Probability x Impact  
Expected Value= [Risk Probability Value]* [Risk Impact Value]  
On the vertical axis, there is probability of the risk occurring, thus a higher chance of 
that risk occurring and becoming an issue. The horizontal axis shows the level of impact in 
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the assumption that the risk will occur. As shown in Figure  4.5, the value outputs near to zero 
point to normal features, while outputs near to one indicate anomalous ones. 
 
Figure  4.5  Rule action 
 
One of the advantages of this approach is being able to show risks and identify how 
risky they are on the database. If all the risks are clustered in the top right of the diagram, 
then evidently the database is very risky. In other words, it may be exploited by a malicious 
writer. 
4.2.3.2  Response Reaction 
In this stage, we will identify the best response against a database threat according to the 
level of severity. Once the risk is estimated from the previous stage, our approach can 
determine the appropriate action response. The reaction of our approach is responsible for 
providing a corresponding response action when an anomaly activity is detected. 
Once the user tries to request a malicious string, the response action will be executed. 
This response action will handle this request according to the severity methods shown in 
Table  4.2. There are six principle methods to handle risk response action according to the 
severity request. 
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Severity Level Severity Level Description 
Low Severity 
No action The system will process as normal 
Alarm Sent notification to DBA 
Medium Severity 
Audit The request is audit 
Hold The user requests is aborted 
High Severity 
Disconnect The user session is disconnect 
Refuse The user request is refused 
Table  4.2 Response actions 
  
Once the risk has been calculated, an appropriate action will be executed according to 
the severity level. For example if the damage potential is very high; reproducibility is very 
high; exploitability is very high ; affected users is high, and discoverability is very high, then 
the risk level is considered very high. 
4.3  Experiment and performance Evaluation: 
4.3.1  Using support vector machine (SVM): 
In order to study a predictive model with the ability to identify legitimate versus illegitimate 
connections within a computer network, the aim for the classifier learning contest was 
organised in aggregation with the KDD ’99 dataset. KDD Cup (1999) database contained a 
broad type of Malware simulated in a military network environment. Some Malware experts 
recommended that most new Malware are variations of known Malware, and the ‘‘signature” 
of known Malware can be enough to find new variants. The datasets contained 24 training 
attack kinds, with 14 added kinds in the test data only.  The KDD Cup 1999 contained 
4,898,431 records in the training set. For the training set, only 19.85% (972,781 records) 
were normal trafﬁc and the remaining were attack trafﬁc. Each record in the KDD Cup 1999 
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data set contained 41 various quantitative and qualitative features (KDD Cup, 1999). The 
data used in classification is NSL-KDD, which is a new dataset for the evaluation of 
researches in network intrusion detection system. NSL-KDD consists of selected records of 
the complete KDD'99 dataset. Each NSL-KDD connection record contains 41 features as 
shown in Table  4.3 [88]. 
 
Table  4.3  KDD'99 dataset features 
We conducted our study by using SVM (Support Vector Machine) as classification. SVM 
categorises the data into two classes. Given a training set of dataset, labelled pairs {(x, y)}, 
Feature Name 
 
Description  Type 
duration  Length of the connection (Sec.) Continuous 
protocol_type  Type of the protocol, e.g. TCP, UDP, etc.  Discrete 
service  Network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, 
  
Discrete 
src_bytes  Number of data bytes from source to destination  Continuous 
dst_bytes  Number of data bytes from destination to source  Continuous 
flag  Normal or error status of the connection  Discrete  
land  1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 
  
Discrete 
wrong_fragment  Number of ``wrong'' fragments  Continuous 
urgent  Number of urgent packets  Continuous 
hot  Number of ``hot'' indicators Continuous 
num_failed_logins  Number of failed login attempts  Continuous 
logged_in  1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise  Discrete 
num_compromised  Number of ``compromised'' conditions  Continuous 
root_shell  1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise  Discrete 
su attempted  1 if ``su root'' command attempted; 0 otherwise  Discrete 
num_root  Number of ``root'' accesses  Continuous 
num_file_creations  Number of file creation operations  Continuous 
num_shells  Number of shell prompts  Continuous 
num_access_files  Number of operations on access control files  Continuous 
num_outbound_cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp session  Continuous 
is_hot_login  1 if the login belongs to the ``hot'' list; 0 otherwise  Discrete 
is_guest_login  1 if the login is a ``guest''login; 0 otherwise  Discrete 
count  Number of connections to the same host as the current 
       
Continuous 
serror_rate  % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors  Continuous 
rerror_rate  % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors  Continuous 
same_srv_rate  % of connections to the same service  Continuous 
diff_srv_rate  % of connections to different services  Continuous 
srv_count  Number of connections to the same service as the 
        
Continuous 
srv_serror_rate  % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors Continuous 
srv_rerror_rate  % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors  Continuous 
srv_diff_host_rate  % of connections to different hosts  Continuous  
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where y is the label of instance x, SVM works by maximizing the margin to obtain the best 
performance in classification. SVM is based on the idea of a hyper plane classifier, where it 
first maps the input vector into a higher dimensional feature space and then obtains the 
optimal separating hyper-plane [89]. The goal of SVM is to find a decision boundary. The 
boundary function of SVM is described by support vectors, which are the data points located 
closest to the class boundary. In the SVM, there are kernels, as listed below, and any of those 
can be chosen to achieve the boundary function. Their detailed usages and descriptions, 
including parameters definitions are as follows: 
1. Linear kernel: The Linear kernel is the simplest kernel function. It is given by the 
inner product < 𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗 > 
  
2. Polynomial kernel: The Polynomial kernel is a non-stationary kernel. Polynomial 
kernels are well suited for problems where all the training data is normalized.  
 
       Where𝑑: degree of polynomial kernel and parameter needed for all types of kernels 
Accept linear; Ɣ: parameter needed for all types of kernels  
3. RBF kernel:  
4. Sigmoid kernel:  
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) is a supervised learning algorithm used for 
classification and regression, and it is a fast implementation of Support Vector Machines 
(SVM).  SMO has been selected to classify normal requests and anomaly requests because it 
is competitive with other SVM training methods such as Projected Conjugate Gradient 
"chunking", and in addition it is easier to implement in WEKA. 
In this study, all the training and test data were applied. All data in the training data or 
test data consisted of 41 features. Each feature value was normalized to the range of [0, 1], by 
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dividing their maximum value, and removing the non-important features for each SVM 
classifier, as listed in Table  4.4. 
 TP 
Rate  
FP 
Rate 
SVM - Linear kernel:  
 
0.972 
0.029 
SVM - Polynomial kernel: : 
 
0.973 
0.029 
SVM - RBF kernel: : 
 
0.974 
0.029 
Table  4.4  SVM results 
We evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach in order to answer 
what percentage our approach can detect. Validation of the models was achieved by using 
cross-validation. Cross-validation is a technique used for evaluating the results of statistical 
analysis by generating an independent dataset for Normal and Anomaly data. The most 
common types of cross-validation were repeated using random sub-sampling validation and 
K-fold cross-validation. For this research, K-fold cross-validation was selected for validation 
as it is commonly adopted for many classifiers. In K-fold cross-validation, the data is first 
partitioned into K sized segments or folds. Then, K iterations of training and validation are 
performed and a different fold of the data is held-out for validation while the remaining K-1 
folds are used for learning. The advantage of K-Fold cross-validation is that all the examples 
in the dataset are eventually used for both training and testing. In addition to this, all 
observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used for 
validation exactly once. 
We evaluated various algorithms based on the following standard performance measures:  
1. True Positive (TP): Number of correctly identified malicious code. 
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2. False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign code, when a detector identifies 
benign file as a Malware.  
3. True Negative (TN): Number of correctly identified benign code.  
4. False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious code, when a detector fails 
to detect the Malware because the virus is new and no signature is yet available.  
Overall Accuracy: proportion of the total number of predictions that were correctly identified 
code, given by: 
 
After applying the four SVM kernels functions, if the received request from the SIDS 
stage has normal behavior as the KDD data behaviors, the system will take a decision there is 
no attack. If the received request has abnormal behavior then the third stage will decide the 
appropriate response against the attack type. 
4.3.2  Risk Level 
In fuzzy logic, the dataset is defined as notions and membership functions. The membership 
function define the truth-value of such linguistic expressions. The degree of membership of 
an object in a fuzzy set is defined as a function where the universe of discourse (set of values 
that the object can take) is the domain, and the interval [0, 1] is the range [90]. Based on set 
theory, fuzzy logic provides a powerful way to define the risk level. Using the FIS editor of a 
Matlab fuzzy toolbox to show general information about a fuzzy inference system, we can 
define input and output names through our implementation as shown in Figure  4.6. 
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Figure  4.6 Risk level 
Then using the member function editor we present the membership function of each 
input parameter corresponding to its range as shown in Figure  4.7.  
 
Figure  4.7  DREAD membership function 
If (Damage potential is Low) AND (Reproducibility is Low) AND 
(Exploitability is Low) AND (Affected users is Low) AND 
(Discoverability is Low) THEN Risk level is Low 
If (Damage potential is High) AND (Reproducibility is High) 
AND (Exploitability is High) AND (Affected users is High ) 
AND(Discoverability is  High) THEN Risk level is High 
If (Damage potential is very High) AND (Reproducibility is 
Very High) AND (Exploitability is Very High) AND (Affected 
users is High) AND (Discoverability is Very High) THEN Risk 
level is Very High 
…………….. 
Table  4.5  Rule editor 
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Figure  4.8 shows the rule viewer.  Using 5 categories from DREAD, the total number of rules 
is 55 = 3125  rules some of these are shown in Table  4.5. 
 
Figure  4.8 Rule viewer 
4.3.3  Response Action: 
Once we finish the risk level, the next step is to determine the response action as shown in 
Table  4.2. The selection method for an alert can be achieved by a set of “if-then” statements 
as shown in Table  4.7. For example, if the DREAD rating for SQL injection is 0.9 (see 
Table  4.6), according to Table  4.7, it executes a response action of high severity.  
Threat D R E A D Total Rating 
SQL commands injected into application. 0 0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.9 High 
Table  4.6  DREAD rating of SQL injection 
IF Expected Value<0.03 Then Execute Response action  
Low Severity= {No Action, Alarm} 
IF Expected Value<=0.25 and Expected Value> 0.03 Then 
Execute Response action Medium Severity= {Audit, Hold} 
IF Expected Value>=0.72 Then Execute Response action  
High Severity= {Abort, Disconnect, Refuse} 
 
Table  4.7 Determine the response action 
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In addition, it allows for adjusting attack metrics in order to make it more effective 
and more flexible against a specific type of attack. For instance, attack alerts with low 
severity levels can be disregarded; attack alerts with medium severity level can be held or 
audited; attack alerts with high severity level can be aborted, disconnected or refused. 
4.4  Conclusion 
Recently, prevention and detection intrusion detection systems have been an active research 
field in both industry and academia. While many detection and prevention solutions have 
been implemented, none of them guarantee a high level of security for web applications. The 
effectiveness of an intrusion detection system sets new demands to achieve a high degree of 
security. A detection system with a response system would be highly reliable against 
suspicious behaviour that could possibly be a zero day attack. We developed IIDPS with a 
response action that provides an early stage detection system. This IIDPS is capable of 
preventing and distinguishing various types of abnormal activity. Signature-based detection 
techniques were used to recognize known attacks, while anomaly based detection techniques 
were used to recognize unidentified attacks. A risk assessment was also done in order to 
respond to the attack, with several response techniques used to minimize the damage caused 
by malicious activities. 
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Chapter 5 : Using Feature Selection for Malware 
Detection System 
              
In this chapter, we focused on using various training functions with feature selection to 
achieve highly accurate results. The data we used in our experiments are NSL-KDD. 
However, the training and testing time to build the model is very high. To address this, we 
proposed feature selection based on information gain, which can detect several attack types 
with accurate result and low false rates. Moreover, we performed experiments to classify 
each of the five classes (normal, probe, denial of service (DoS), user to super-user (U2R), and 
remote to local (R2L). Our proposed model outperformed other state-of-art methods. 
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5.1  Introduction  
Feature selection is the technique of choosing most relevant features for creating appropriate 
IDS models[91]. A good intrusion system gives accurate and efficient classification results. 
This ability is an essential functionality to build a malware detection system[91, 92]. One  of  
the  main  issues  with  IDSs  is  the  overhead,  which  can  become too  high, as the most 
IDS examine the whole data features to detect attack. A number of the features may be 
unnecessary or contribute little to detect attack. The purpose of this chapter is to recognize 
significant features in creating IDS that are more effective to detect several kinds of attack. 
Features may possibly hold unnecessary information, which cause a false detecting of 
malware. In addition, a number of features could be extra as the information they provide is 
included in other features. Large features can raise the time required and impair attack 
detection, and can effect of detecting attack. Thus, we propose feature selection techniques, 
which can be easily implemented in our IDS. 
Two methods of data mining technique have been applied in intrusion detection 
systems: classification and clustering analyses. In the context of data mining, description 
tends to be more significant than prediction. However, if we were aiming to predict the 
activity of an intrusion based on behavior activities, prediction is more significant. 
Classification is learning a function for categorizing unseen data into one of several 
predefined classes based on a set of training data, while in clustering the classes are not 
predefined at the stage of learning, and the learning stage is used to determine the classes in 
the database. If the purpose of the intrusion detection system is to distinguish an abnormal 
from a normal action, classification is more appropriate to accomplish this task.  If the 
purpose of the system seeks to identify the type of attack or malicious action, clustering is 
more appropriate [93].   
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However, many researchers proposed to detect an attack in the KDD datasets [94]. 
Nevertheless, these proposals were not able to achieve good performance in terms of the 
detection and false alarm rate using the KDD dataset especially for new attacks 
[88][94][106]. Moreover, the existing (IDS) examine all features to detect intrusion. However 
taking all features may lead to a  misclassification of an attack and take a long time to build 
the model [84]. Thus, in this chapter we propose a method of feature selection based on 
information gain to detect both the old and the new attacks in KDD dataset. However, our 
proposal can successfully recognize the important features selection to build an (Intrusion 
Detection Systems) IDS.  
After introducing the basic concepts of intrusion detection system in section 5.1, the 
rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section  5.2 - The Related Work of Intrusion 
Detection; Section  5.3 – Presentation of Experimental Set up and Methodology; Section 5.3– 
Summary of Results. 
5.2  Background 
Most research systems could effectively use training data to improve detection performance 
and minimize false alarm rates for known attacks. Researchers, however, missed many 
important new attacks, especially when the attack mechanism applied differed from the old 
attack. These results need further research in approaches that could detect new attacks with 
high accuracy and low false alarms. 
According to Shi-Jinn [95] studies revealed that not all researchers performed feature 
selection before classifier training. However, the feature selection is a significant component 
of identifying different types of attacks [84, 96]. In their work [97] examined the efficiency 
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of two feature selection algorithms applying Bayesian networks (BN) and Classification and 
Regression Trees (CART) and an ensemble of BN and CART. 
Literature has shown some of the features can be discarded, without affecting the 
performance of the IDS [98]. Very little scientific efforts have been directed to model 
efficient IDS feature selection. IDS tasks are often modelled as a classification problem in a 
machine-learning context [99]. 
Currently, there are a few public datasets like KDD’99, DARPA 1998 and DARPA 
1999; however, much related work considers these datasets for their experiments. The data 
used in our classification is NSL-KDD, which is a recent dataset for the evaluation of 
researches in NIDS, an improved version of KDDCup 1999 dataset. Very few studies use 
non-public or their own datasets. This result shows that these public datasets are recognized 
as standard datasets in intrusion detection. Despite many advances that have been achieved, 
existing IDSs still have some difficulties in improving their performance to meet the needs of 
detecting increasing types of attacks in high-speed networks. For example, the SVM 
technique failed to manipulate a large dataset due to storage issues, or may take a long time to 
finish the training. This study used the KDD dataset to minimize the amount of time and 
improve the accuracy rate. Another difficulty was the improvement of the detection power for 
complex or new attacks without false alarms. SIDS has effectively detected prior attacks, but 
it has difficultly in detecting novel attacks. The main advantage of anomaly detection systems 
is that they can detect new types of attacks by built models of normal behaviors; the false 
alarm rates in anomaly-based IDSs are usually high.  
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5.3  Experimental Setup and Methodology 
This section describes our methodology, intrusion detection dataset, feature selection, 
training and testing dataset before and after feature selection approach and experimental 
setup. Our experiment aims to learn from the NLS-KDD dataset while performing a 
prediction process on whether a packet should be considered normal or abnormal. 
5.3.1  Methodology 
Our purpose is to design a classifier with feature selection, which could give the best accuracy 
for each category of attack patterns. The first step is to carefully construct the different 
connectional models to achieve the best generalization performance for classifiers. We 
performed experiments on Intel Processor: 3.64 GHz, Memory (RAM): 96 GB RAM with 
Windows XP operating system. Also we performed 5-class classification of the dataset using 
WEKA machine learning tool to classify the KDD dataset.  
The stages of the experiment are shown in Figure  5.1. 
 
Figure  5.1  Experiment methodology 
1) Feature selection stage: In this stage, an information theoretic feature selection 
approach (Gray, 2010) is applied to normalized training and test Dataset for generating 
reduced feature set selection. 
   104 
 
2) Classification stage: This involves two phases; namely the training phase and the 
testing phase. 
3) Analysis of the result: After testing phase, we compute the accuracy rate, false alarm 
rate and the time to build the model. 
5.3.2  Intrusion Detection Dataset: 
The NSL-KDD intrusion detection benchmark consists of categories of attacks representing 
generalizations of specific attack types [100]. These main categories represent classifications 
of types of behavior that can be grouped logically together. So, for each category, there are 
multiple attack types. Table  5.1 shows these attack categories along with the 22 attack types. 
The KDD learning set distribution is shown in Figure  5.2   
Attack Type Attack Pattern 
Probe Ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan, mscan, saint 
Dos 
back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop, apache2, mailbomb, processtable, 
udpstorm 
U2R Buffer_overﬂow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, ps,  sqlattack 
R2L 
ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, 
warezmaster, xlook, xsnoop, snmpguess, worm 
Table  5.1 Attack types 
In addition, each attack category (U2R, R2L, DoS, or Probing) is composed of a given 
number of attacks. Some of these attacks are known (For, U2R is composed of six attacks: 
buffer overflow, httptunnel, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, ps,  sqlattack) among them we can 
distinguish 4 new attacks: httptunnel, ps, sqlattack, and xterm (see Table  5.1). We will focus in 
this study on applying our original approach to detect both the known and the new attacks of 
the KDD dataset.  
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In the KDD99 data set, each data record corresponds to the features of a connection in 
the network data flow. Each connection is labeled either as normal or as an attack, with 
exactly one specific attack type. The data records are all labeled with one of the following five 
types [94]: 
• Denials-of Service (DoS): the attackers try to make the computer service unavailable. 
An attacker sends many packet to the victim such as (. apache, smurf, Neptune, Ping of 
death, back, mail bomb, udpstorm, SYNflood, etc.). Probing or surveillance attacks 
have the goal of gaining knowledge of the existence or configuration of a computer 
system or network. Port Scans or sweeping of a given IP-address range typically fall in 
this category. 
• Probe Layer attacks have the goal to gain user information from a network such as 
(mscan ,saint, port sweep, nmap) 
• User-to-Root (U2R) attackers access user data on the computer system. 
• Remote-to-Local(R2L) attackers send malicious strings to a victim over the network, 
the attacker exposes the client vulnerabilities and exploits privileges which a local user 
would have on the computer (e.g. xclock, dictionary, guest password, phf, send mail, 
xsnoop, etc.). 
 
 
Figure  5.2. Dataset distribution 
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Table  5.2   KDD dataset features 
5.3.3  Feature Selection 
The four cited attack categories contain 22 training attack types. KDD dataset contains 41 
features as shown in Table  5.2. Twenty-one of these features describe the connection itself 
and 19 of them describe the properties of connections to the same host within the final two 
seconds. These features can be categorized as either Content Features of Network Connection 
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Records (see Table  5.3; Connection based features (see Table  5.4 or Traffic feature (see 
Table  5.5). Table  5.6 illustrates all the KDD features. 
 
Table  5.3 Content features of network connection records 
 
Feature Description Value Type 
hot number of “hot indicators” continuous 
failed logins number of failed login attempts continuous 
logged in 1 - successfully logged in; 0 - otherwise discrete 
compromised number of “compromised” conditions continuous 
root shell 1 - root shell is obtained; 0 - otherwise discrete 
su 1 - “su root” command attempted; 0 -otherwise discrete 
file creations number file creation operations continuous 
shells number of shell prompts continuous 
access files number of write, delete, and create operations 
on access control files 
continuous 
outbound cmds number of outbound commands in a ftp session continuous 
hot login 1 - the login belongs to the “hot” list (e.g., root, 
adm, etc.); 0 - otherwise 
discrete 
guest login 1 - The login is a “guest” login (e.g., guest, 
nonymous, etc.)  ; 0 - otherwise 
discrete 
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Table  5.4 Content features of network connection records 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature Description Value type 
duration length (number of seconds) of the connection continuous 
protocol type Type of the protocol like FDDI. tcp, udp, etc. discrete 
service is a service hosted on a computer network like   destination 
Domain Name System (DNS), DHCP, NetBIOS 
discrete 
source bytes number of data bytes from source to destination continuous 
dst bytes number of data bytes from destination to 
source 
continuous 
flag normal or error status of the connection discrete 
land 1  -  connection   is   from/to   the   same 
host/port; 0 - otherwise 
discrete 
wrong fragment number of “wrong” fragments continuous 
urgent number of urgent packets continuous 
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Table  5.5 Traffic feature 
 
Table  5.6 Kinds of features 
Due to the redundancy of some features, increased computation time on extra features and 
the impact on accuracy of IDS, we improved the performance of the classification algorithm 
by using useful features. Feature selection is important for intrusion in order to increase the 
accuracy and the performance. We present our work for identifying intrusion by using features 
selection and evaluating the applicability of these features in detecting intrusions. We also 
Feature Description Value Type 
count number of connections to the same host 
as the current connection in the past 2 seconds 
continuous 
serror % % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous 
rerror % % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous 
same srv  % of connections to the same service continuous 
diff srv % % of connections to different services continuous 
srv count number of connections to the same service  as  the  current  
connection  in the past 2 seconds 
continuous 
srv serror % % of connections that have “SYN” error continuous 
srv rerror % % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous 
srv diff host % % of connections to different hosts continuous 
 
(KDDCup 99) 
features Meaning 
content-based 
features number of packets, acknowledgments, data bytes from src to dest) 
time-based 
traffic features 
included number of connections or different services from the same source 
or the same destination considering recent time interval 
connection 
based features 
included number of connections from same source or to same destination 
 or with the same service considering in last N connections 
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1. 𝑰𝑰 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ,  
2. 𝑰𝑰 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 high 𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙,  
3. If accuracy low and training time high, then  the feature is unimportant 
4. 𝑰𝑰 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑙, 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒂 
5. 𝑰𝑰 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑡𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡 
 
𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝑡ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 
𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒂 the 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 
 𝑡ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 
 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑑  , 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒂 𝑡ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 
present different feature selection methods for intrusion detection and rank the importance of 
the features by the absolute values of weights according to the ranking method. 
Each feature will be rated as “very important”, “important”, or “unimportant” according to 
the following rules: 
 
According to these rules, the 41 features are rated into the three kinds {< 𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑓 >, < 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑓 >, (𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑓)} 
For all of the five classes of attack, we applied information gain to 41 features of the KDD 
dataset. Then we considered the values of features are {< 𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑓, <
𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑓 >}  
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Figure  5.3 Information gain for different feature 
We applied these criteria of selection using information gain as shown in Figure  5.3. 
Information gain, originally used to compute splitting criteria for decision trees, is often used 
to find out how well each single feature separates the given data set. The overall entropy I of a 
given dataset S is defined as [101] 
𝐼(𝑆) = −�𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑖2 𝑖𝑖𝑐
𝑖=1
 
Where C denotes the total number of classes and pi the portion of instances that belong to 
class i. The reduction in entropy or the information gain is computed for each attribute 
according to 𝐼𝐺(𝑆,𝐴) = 𝐼(𝑆) − ∑ �𝑆𝐴,𝑣�|𝑆|𝑣ℇ𝐴 𝐼(𝑆𝑣)where v a value of is A and  SA,v    the set of 
instances where A value has v. We applied information gain into 41 features of KDD dataset 
as the quality of the feature selection is one of the most important factors that affect the 
effectiveness of IDS. 
 
 
   112 
 
5.4  Performance Evaluation 
In our experiments, we have evaluated various algorithms based on the following standard 
performance measures  
- True positive (TP): Number of correctly identified malicious code.  
- True negative (TN): Number of correctly identified benign code. 
- False positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign code, when a detector 
identifies benign file as a Malware. 
- False negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious code, when a detector 
fails to detect the Malware because the virus is new and no signature is yet available.   
- Detection Rate (DR) : the number of correctly classified positive examples divided by 
the total number of examples that are classified as positive, according to the following 
equation ; 
FPTP
TPDR
+
=  
- Precision  of  a  classifier  is  the  proportion  of  positive  predictions  made  by  the 
classifier that are true.  
- Recall  is  the  percentage  of  correct  positive  that  are  truly  detected  by  the 
classifier.  
-  F-measure is defined as the harmonic mean of recall and precision according the 
following equation; 
ecisioncall
ecisioncall
PrRe
Pr*Re*2measure-F
+
=  
                                            Predicted attack Predicated normal 
Actual attack                 True positive (TP)  False negative (FN) 
Actual normal           False positive (FP)  True negative (TN)  
Table  5.7  Confusion matrix
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  Normal Probe U2R R2L DoS 
Normal X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 
Probe X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 
U2R X31 X32 X33 X34 X35 
R2L X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 
DoS X51 X52 X53 X54 X55 
Table  5.8  Confusion matrix of IDSS 
In general the confusion matrix is shown in Table  5.7. In the confusion matrix shown 
in Table  5.8, the element 𝑋𝑖𝑗 (1 ≤  𝑖 ≤  5, 1 ≤  𝑗 ≤  5) denotes the number of records that 
belong to class  𝑖  and were classified as class j by IDSs. Therefore, based on the confusion 
matrix, we can easily compute other performance criteria such as the detection rate of class i: 
 𝐷𝑅 (𝑖) = Xii
∑ Xij5i=1
   And the false alarm rate of IDSs can be computed by   𝐹 (𝑖) = 1 − Xii
∑ Xij5i=1
  
5.4.1  Experiment Using Decision Trees for Supervised Learning 
Decision tree algorithms are supervised learning algorithms which recursively partition the 
data base on its attributes, until some stopping condition is reached. This recursive 
partitioning gives rise to a tree-like structure. The aim is that the final partitions (leaves of the 
tree) are homogeneous with respect to the classes, and the internal nodes of the tree are 
decisions about the attributes that were used to reach the leaves. The decisions are usually 
simple attribute tests, using one attribute at a time to discriminate the data. New data can be 
classified by following the conditions defined at the nodes down. J.R. Quinlan has 
popularized the decision tree approach. The latest public domain implementation of 
Quinlan’s model is C4.5 [102]. The Weka classifier package has its own version of C4.5 
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known as J48. WEKA is open source Java code created by researchers at the University of 
Waikato in New Zealand [103]. 
We used 10-fold Cross-Validation. The data was divided randomly into 10 parts in 
which the class was represented in approximately the same proportions as in the full dataset. 
Each part was held out in turn and the learning scheme trained on the remaining nine-tenths; 
then its error rate was calculated on the holdout set. The learning procedure was executed a 
total of 10 times on different training sets, and finally the 10 error rates were averaged to yield 
an overall error estimate. 
5.4.2  Results 
An initial analysis was performed to determine the accurate result and false-alarm rates. In 
terms of training and testing speed, the feature selection and tree decision is five times faster 
in terms of the time to build the model without feature selection as shown in Figure  5.4. 
 
Figure  5.4  Processing speed comparison for J48 classifier of 41- dimensional feature Vs. J48 
classifier of 12- dimensional feature 
The detailed analysis of accuracy by J48 classification using 12 features is shown in 
Table  5.9, and Table  5.10 shows the detailed accuracy by J48 classification using 41 features. 
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0.997 0.002 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.999 DoS 
0.985 0.014 0.982 0.985 0.983 0.995 normal 
0.978 0.002 0.986 0.978 0.982 0.994 Probing 
0.972 0.002 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.992 U2R 
0.913 0.006 0.919 0.913 0.916 0.989 R2L 
0.982 0.007 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.996 Weighted Avg. 
Table  5.9  Details accuracy by J48 classification using 12 features 
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0.996 0.002 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 DoS 
0.985 0.014 0.982 0.985 0.983 0.995 normal 
0.98 0.001 0.989 0.98 0.984 0.995 Probing 
0.973 0.002 0.971 0.973 0.972 0.991 U2R 
0.919 0.005 0.925 0.919 0.922 0.99 R2L 
0.983 0.007 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.995 Weighted Avg. 
Table  5.10 Details accuracy by J48 classification using 41 features 
Table  5.11 shows the confusion matrix tree J48 classification by using 12 features, 9562 of 
the actual ‘normal’ test set were detected to be normal.  For Precision, 0.982% was detected 
correctly. In the same way, for ‘DoS’ 7432 of the actual ‘attack’ test set were correctly 
detected; for ‘Probe’ 2367 of the actual ‘attack’ test set were correctly detected; for ‘U2R’ 
1391 of the actual ‘attack’ test set were correctly detected; for ‘R2L’ 1391 of the actual 
‘attack’ test set were correctly detected. 
   116 
 
  DoS Normal Probe U2R R2L 
DoS 7432 15 8 3 0 
Normal 11 9562 15 20 103 
Probe 12 35 2367 4 3 
U2R 0 20 4 1391 16 
R2L 3 109 7 13 1391 
Table  5.11 Confusion matrix using tree J48 classification by using 12 features 
Many intrusion detection systems are proposed by researchers to achieve a high accurate 
result for the classification. As shown in Table  5.12, the proposed classifiers demonstrate 
better performance in classification rate category among the mentioned models. 
 
Model 
 
Classification rate 
Normal    Probe   R2L    DoS     U2R           
 
Detection 
Rate 
 
False Alarm 
Proposed model 98.2 99.6 99.7 97.2 92.5 98.2 0.17 
ARTMAP [104] 99.82 84.93 99.72 17.52 59.28 96.81 0.18 
PNrule [105] 99.5 73.2 96.9 6.6 10.7 91.1 0.4 
Winner of KDD in 2000 
[94] 
99.5 83.3 97.1 13.2 8.4 91.8 0.6 
Runner up of KDD in 
2000 [106] 
99.4 84.5 97.5 11.8 7.3 91.5 0.6 
ESC-IDS [107] 98.2 84.1 99.5 14.1 31.5 95.3 1.9 
MLP with 38 selected 
features [29] 
99.6 75.5 99.7 14.3 32.7 94.9 0.36 
Table  5.12  Performance comparison 
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5.5  Conclusion 
Our research illustrated the significance of using a suitable feature with appropriate 
classification for modeling IDSs. We evaluated the effective value of the decision tree as the 
data mining method for the IDSs with appropriate features. We concluded before training, 
that the step of feature selection may be considered. The process of feature selection 
identifies which features are more useful than the others. This has the benefit of generally 
improving system performance by eliminating irrelevant and redundant features. Therefore, 
feature selection could improve some level of classification accuracy in intrusion detection. 
Our proposed method is evaluated on a huge data set. The features selection in this 
chapter successfully achieved high results in terms of the accuracy, false alarms and the time 
to build the module using appropriate features based on information gain. 
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Chapter 6  Multi stage Rules for Malware Prevention 
System 
             
In this chapter, we address the problem of detecting and preventing known and unknown 
attacks with identify an attack group. Also, generate a new signature for the signature 
database to use in the potential attack. However, it is extremely hard for AIDS to have high 
detection rates and low False-alarm rates at the same time. Thus, it is necessary to develop 
systematic approaches to identify attack behaviors in the framework of malware detection 
and prevention. We provide new multi-stage rules for detecting anomalies in multi-stage 
rules in order to use the training data from recorded attack behaviors to improve performance. 
We used the RIPPER classifiers to generate attack signature, which is capable of creating rule 
sets more quickly and automatically, and can determine the attack types with smaller 
numbers of rules. These rules would be efficient to apply for Signature Intrusion Detection 
System (SIDS) and Anomaly Intrusion Detection System (AIDS). Rising Internet attacks 
pose severe challenges to developing an effective Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that can 
detect known and unknown malicious attack. 
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6.1  Introduction 
In this section, we justify why a new approach is needed to detect known and unknown 
malware. Rising Internet attacks pose severe challenges to developing an effective Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) to detect known and unknown malicious attack. Intrusion detection 
is the method of recognizing user activities that may possibly steer a computer system from a 
secured state to an unsecure state. Since the quantity of attacks against computer systems 
increases regularly, it is very important for IDS to be effective; this means, it should detect 
known and unknown attacks with minimum false alarms. However, most of  the IDS 
designed  have problems to efficiently  detecting  all  the attack  attempts  and  need  a  
quantity of  computational overhead, making  it challenging   to create real-time IDS. 
As discussed in chapter 2, previous intrusion detection techniques mostly rely on 
signature patterns of well-known Malware and make decisions by matching up to signatures.   
Nevertheless, it is very hard for this approach to detect zero day attacks with unidentified 
signatures [19, 108]. AIDS use a model of the normal system behavior and try to find 
important features from this model in the data achieved through the real behavior of the 
system [109].  However, AIDS has attracted the interest of many researchers to overcome the 
disadvantage of SIDS. AIDS detects users’ activities that are not the usual behaviour on a 
computer network. According to this approach, the assumption is that attacker behaviour 
deviates from normal user behaviour. Thus, AIDS involves the training stage and a testing 
stage. In the training stage, the normal traffic profile is labeled by using data that is accepted 
as normal behaviour; in the latter, the testing stage is applied to new data set. The result of 
this is that the AIDS have the ability to monitor the activities of new users and compare the 
new data with the obtained profile and try to detect deviations. Those different from normal 
behaviour are considered as attacks [56]. 
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AIDS is categorized into many sub-kinds in the literature such as statistical 
techniques, data mining, artificial neural networks, and genetic algorithms and so on. The 
main benefit of an anomaly-based scheme is the power to detect zero days Malware, as the 
AIDS does not depend on a signatures database. It uses a model describing normal user 
behavior, and any abnormal behavior that deviates from the model is identified. Thus, AIDS 
has many advantages. First, they have the ability to find insider attacks and second they rely 
on the users profiles. Thus it is extremely hard for an attacker to identify what the normal 
user activity is without generating an alarm [35]. This is because AIDS uses machine learning 
techniques in order to build user profiles. Unfortunately, making a user profiles is a 
challenging task because AIDS is looking for unusual activity rather than actual malicious 
activity [35]. 
An independent approach for (AIDS) and (SIDS) will not be as effective as a 
collaborative approach to detect known and unknown attacks at the same time. This is 
because intrusive activity does not match with anomalous activity every time. There are five 
probabilities as shown in Figure  6.1. To address this problem, we present a Multi stage Rules 
approach to create a robust model, which can reveal behaviors of attackers. The central idea 
is to apply sequential multi stage rules to learn rules that accurately capture the behavior of 
intrusions and normal activities. If user activity does not satisfy any of the normal profile 
rules, then it is considered as new attack. These rules can then be applied for signature 
detection and anomaly detection. Our approach can give an accurate boundary between 
normal activities and intrusion. 
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 This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related research. Section 3 
briefly describes our approach and discusses  how they  can   be   applied  to   generate  
intrusion and  normal rules,  which  are   the  basis for creating misuse detection  models  and   
anomaly  detection  models. Section 4 reports the results of our experiments on building an 
intrusion detection approach. 
6.2  Classification Algorithms 
Intrusion detection can be treated as a classification problem where we categorize every data 
set records into set of potential groups such as normal or a specific class of intrusion. 
However, the performance of IDS model  will depend on a classification model that can be 
predict new incoming data as belonging to the normal class or the attack class as shown in 
Figure  6.2. 
Figure 6.1 Probability to identify the intrusion and normal 
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Figure  6.2  Anomaly detection systems 
In this next section, we describe our approach and demonstrate how we apply out 
approach to generate several rules. 
6.2.1  Multi Stage Rules Detection 
Our central idea depends on the combination of SIDS and AIDS to generate accurate rules 
based on our assumption as shown in Table  6.1. 
  The SIDS and AIDS Model are combined by a decision tree based classifier at the 
first stage as shown in Figure  6.3. This stage separates out normal traffic from attack traffic 
(containing both known and unknown attack). The generation attack rules are placed at the 
second stage. The abnormal traffic is sent to stage two and stage three to be classified into 
different categories as shown in Figure  6.3. 
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SIDS AIDS Rules 
Attack Attack1, Attack2… Attack1, Attack2… 
Attack Normal Attack 
Normal Attack Attack1, Attack2… 
Normal Normal Normal 
Table  6.1  Rules generations 
Based on the above table we can generate the following rules: 
 
 
In order to apply our techniques for rule generation, our approach begins from a 
simple equality decision tree matching for corresponding anomalous behavior; this stage is 
called SIDS. This can be done by determining the general features of the attack 
characteristics, as well as specifics of the normal characteristics which distinguish general 
attacks as shown in Figure  6.3. At each stage, the group attack category is being separated 
from the normal behavior or different attack. On the first stage all suspicious behavior is 
separated from the normal data. The benefit from this stage, when we create features these 
would have high information gain   because their value ranges can isolate anomalies from the 
normal records. In this stage, classifier C4.5 (J48) is selected as the decision tree algorithm. 
We have applied Weka’s J48 algorithm, the Weka’s version of C4.5, with default 
parameters[103]. J48 is an optimized execution of C4.5. Decision trees provide popular and 
powerful models for machine learning. Some of the significant features of decision trees have 
the following:  they are basically reasonable and intuitive; they produce graphical models as 
well as a set of rules; they need a little effort from users for data preparation; decision trees 
1. If SIDS is Attack and AIDS is Attack, then it is 
Attack  
2. If SIDS is Attack is and AIDS is Normal, then it 
is Attack  
3. If SIDS is Normal and AIDS is Attack, then it is 
Attack  
4. If SIDS is Normal and AIDS is  Normal, then  it is 
Normal 
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are generally robust and scalable; they can handle distinct and continuous data; decision trees 
can be used for datasets containing a huge amount of data; their inference process, similarly 
to their induction, requires low computational cost [110].  
C4.5 belongs to a sequence of decision tree learners that trace their source back to the  
research  of  Hunt  and  others  in the  late 1950s and  early 1960s  [111]. C4.5 use 
information  gain to decide which variable to split [112]. The information gain from splitting 
a node t is defined as: 
 InfoGainsplit=Entropy (t) − ∑nin Entropy(i).   
Where i represents one of the sub-nodes after splitting (assuming there are 2 sub-
nodes), 𝑡𝑖 is the number of instances in subnote i, and n stands for the total number of 
instances. In binary-class classification, the entropy of node t is defined as: 
 Entropy (t) = −∑ j
tj=1,2 logp jt      ; Where j is represents one of the two classes. 
The second stage defines the similar rule of the same attack groups and at the same 
time brings about the general features of the other attacks which distinguish the rest from that 
attack. These rules are created by using RIPPER algorithm [113], which was introduced by 
Cohen and considered to be one of the most frequently implemented rule-based algorithms in 
practice. Also, the rules for attack profiles are defined and test traffic is tested against them. If 
the data instance doesn't satisfy any of the normal profile rules, then it is considered as a new 
attack as shown in Figure  6.3 on stage 2. 
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Figure  6.3  Multi-stage rules for anomaly detection 
Our approach uses rule learning classification in order to describe the attack group, 
where rules are created for each stage in classification. These classifiers select strong rules 
among each attack. 
6.2.2  The Ripper Classifier  
RIPPER [19] is a classification rule learning program, an extended version of learning 
algorithm IREP (Incremental Reduced Error Pruning). Before creating a  rule,  the  current  
training data set  is divided into  two subsets, a growing  set (usually  2/3)  and  a  pruning  set 
(usually 1/3).  The rule is generated from the growing set. And then the rule set starts with an 
empty rule set and more rules are added to the grouping list until no negative examples are 
covered. 
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Once rules are increasing from the collection set, the condition is removed from the 
rule in order to increase the efficiency of the rule set on the pruning examples. To reduce a 
rule, RIPPER considers only a last sequence of conditions from the rule, and chooses the 
deletion that maximizes the function. 
6.3  Performance Analysis  
6.3.1  Intrusion Detection Dataset  
The experiment was performed on the NSL-KDD data set which  was  proposed  to  solve  
some  issues  in  the  KDD Cup’99 data set that is commonly used for IDS evaluation [20][3]. 
This data set contains fewer records in both the train and the test, which aids researchers to 
execute their experiments on the whole sets instead of only small portions. The NSL-KDD 
intrusion detection benchmark consists of categories of attacks representing generalizations 
of specific attack types. These main categories represent classifications of types of behavior 
that can be grouped logically together. So, for each category, there are multiple attack types. 
Table  6.2 shows these attack categories along with the 22 attack types. 
Attack type Attack pattern 
Probe Ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan, mscan, saint 
Dos back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop, apache2, mailbomb, processtable, udpstorm 
U2R Buffer_overﬂow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, ps,  sqlattack 
R2L ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, warezmaster, xlook, xsnoop, snmpguess, worm 
Table  6.2 Attack categories 
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Table  6.3 Dataset Features 
In addition, each attack category (U2R, R2L, DoS, or Probing) is composed of a given 
number of attacks. Some of these attacks are known (For, U2R is composed of eight attacks 
buffer overflow, httptunnel, loadmodule). 
In the KDD99 data set, each data record corresponds to the features of a connection in the 
network data flow as shown in  
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For Table  6.3, each connection is labeled either as normal or as an attack, with exactly 
one specific attack type. The data records are all labeled with one of the following five types: 
• Denials-of Service (DoS): the attackers try to make the computer service unavailable. 
An attacker sends many packets to the victim such as (. apache, smurf, Neptune, Ping of 
death, back, mail bomb, udpstorm, SYNflood, etc.). 
• Probing or surveillance attacks have the goal of gaining knowledge of the existence or 
configuration of a computer system or network. Port Scans or sweeping of a given IP-
address range typically fall in this category such as (mscan ,saint, port sweep, nmap) 
• User-to-Root (U2R) attacker access to a user data on the computer system. 
• Remote-to-Local(R2L) attackers send a malicious string to a victim over the network, 
to expose client vulnerabilities and exploit privileges which a local user would have on 
the computer (e.g. xclock, dictionary, guest). 
6.4  Detection Results 
The effectiveness of IDS is assessed by its ability to create the right predictions. According to 
the real nature of a given event contrasted with the prediction from the IDS, four potential 
results are shown in Table  6.4, known as the confusion matrix.  
A
ct
ua
l 
C
la
ss
  
 
                       Predicated Class  
 Normal  Attack 
Normal  True positive (TP) False Positive (FP) 
Attack False Negative(FN) True negative (TN) 
Table  6.4  Confusion matrix 
 
  Normal Probe U2R R2L DoS 
Normal X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 
Probe X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 
U2R X31 X32 X33 X34 X35 
R2L X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 
DoS X51 X52 X53 X54 X55 
Table  6.5  Confusion matrix of IDSS 
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Table  6.5 shows the confusion matrix, the element 𝑋𝑖𝑗 (1 ≤  𝑖 ≤  5, 1 ≤  𝑗 ≤  5) denotes 
the number of records that belong to class  𝑖  and were classified as class j by IDSs. 
Therefore, based on the confusion matrix, we can easily compute other performance criteria 
such as the detection rate of class i: 𝐷𝑅 (𝑖) = Xii
∑ Xij5i=1
   ; and the false alarm rate of IDSs can be 
computed by   𝐹 (𝑖) = 1 − Xii
∑ Xij5i=1
  
The proposed multi stage rules approach is being conducted to evaluate NSL-KDD Data Set. 
Separating one class at a time is described below stages: 
6.4.1  First Stage:  
The first stage is to learn a model using two classes - anomaly class and normal class. The 
objective for this stage is to differentiate anomaly class from a normal traffic. We report the 
performance of our detection models in the followings Tables (Table  6.6 and Table  6.7):       
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normal 0.996 0.004 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 
anomaly 0.996 0.004 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.998 
Avg 0.996 0.004 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998 
Table  6.6 Detailed accuracy by stage 1 classifier 
 
  Normal Anomaly 
Normal 13389 60 
Anomaly 51 11692 
Table  6.7  Confusion matrix by stage 1 classifier 
6.4.2  Second Stage:  
This stage learns from anomaly activities. We have chosen to use RIPPER rules. In order to 
evaluate this stage, we set intrusions to gather into a number of small clusters as shown in 
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Table  6.2. Once the normal are separated, the Dos, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks are trained. 
Each attack categories have rules for effective detection. The details of accuracy and number 
of rules over all four intrusion groups are shown in Table  6.8 to Table  6.10. 
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DoS 0.997 0.005 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Pobing 0.989 0.002 0.993 0.989 0.991 0.996 
U2R 0.984 0.003 0.98 0.984 0.982 0.998 
R2L 0.975 0.003 0.978 0.975 0.976 0.994 
Avg. 0.992 0.004 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.997 
Table  6.8  Detailed accuracy by stage 2 classifier 
 
  DoS Probing U2R R2L 
 DoS 7438 14 0 6 
 Pobing 14 2394 5 8 
 U2R 3 0 1408 20 
 R2L 10 4 24 1485 
Table  6.9  Confusion matrix by stage 2 classifier 
Number of Rules 27 
Correctly Classified Instances 99.1584 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 0.8416 % 
Time taken to build model 0.38 seconds 
Table  6.10 shows generation RIPPER rules from stage 2 for identify all variety of intrusions. 
Can be integrated into misuse detection systems 
(F >= 93) and (F <= 237) and (B = tcp) and (AC >= 1) and (E 
>= 25) => Class=U2R (1182.0/1.0)(W <= 2) and (C = other) and 
(AJ <= 0.02) and (B = tcp) => Class=U2R (125.0/0.0) 
(F >= 46) and (C = pop_3) => Class=U2R 
   ……………………………………………….. 
Table  6.10 RIPPER rules from stage 2 classifier 
6.4.3  Third stage 3 
For Stage three, anomaly detection, instead of training the full data set, the data set can be first 
classified based on attack categories. In this stage we can identify all attacks and with detailed 
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rules for each attack. The details of accuracy and the number of rules over all four intrusion 
groups are shown in (Table  6.11 to Table  6.22). 
A. DOS Attack: 
Number of Rules 11 
Correctly Classified Instances 99.93% 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 0.07% 
Time taken to build model 0.64 seconds 
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1 0 1 1 1 1 neptune 
1 0 0.997 1 0.998 1 smurf 
0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 0.999 apache2 
1 0 1 1 1 1 back 
1 0 1 1 1 1 processtable 
0.951 0 1 0.951 0.975 1 pod 
1 0 1 1 1 1 mailbomb 
1 0 0.857 1 0.923 1 teardrop 
1 0 1 1 1 1 land 
0 0 0 0 0 1 udpstorm 
0.999 0 0.999 0.999 0.999 1 Avg 
Table  6.11  Detailed accuracy for DOS attack 
 
a b c d e f g h i j <-- classified  
4657 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a = neptune 
0 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b = smurf 
1 0 736 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c = apache2 
0 0 0 359 0 0 0 0 0 0 d = back 
0 0 0 0 685 0 0 0 0 0 e = processtable 
0 2 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 f = pod 
0 0 0 0 0 0 293 0 0 0 g = mailbomb 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 h = teardrop 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 i = land 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 j = udpstorm 
Table  6.12  Confusion matrix for DOS attack 
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(B = udp) and (E <= 0) => AP=udpstorm (2.0/0.0) 
(G >= 1) => AP=land (7.0/0.0) 
(B = udp) => AP=teardrop (12.0/0.0) 
(H >= 1) => AP=pod (36.0/0.0) 
     ……………………………………………….. 
Table  6.13  RIPPER rules for DOS 
 
B. Probing 
Number of Rules 19 
Correctly Classified Instances 95.6216 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 4.3784 % 
Time taken to build model 0.34 seconds 
      
 
(D = SH) => AP=nmap (73.0/0.0) 
(AK >= 0.5) and (B = icmp) => AP=ipsweep (137.0/0.0) 
(B = icmp) and (E <= 18) => AP=ipsweep (4.0/0.0) 
……………………………………………….. 
Table  6.14  RIPPER rules for probing 
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 0.884 0.028 0.827 0.884 0.855 0.955 saint 
0.991 0.008 0.989 0.991 0.99 0.994 mscan 
0.927 0.018 0.956 0.927 0.941 0.983 satan 
1 0 1 1 1 1 nmap 
0.986 0.001 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.996 ipsweep 
0.975 0.001 0.981 0.975 0.978 0.988 portsweep 
0.956 0.013 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.986 Avg 
Table  6.15  Detailed accuracy for probing 
 
   a b c d e f <-- classified as 
282 9 25 0 1 2 a = saint 
5 987 3 0 1 0 b = mscan 
52 1 681 0 0 1 c = satan 
0 0 0 73 0 0 d = nmap 
2 0 0 0 139 0 e = ipsweep 
0 1 3 0 0 153 f = portsweep 
Table  6.16  Confusion matrix for probing 
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C. R2L 
Number of Rules 17 
Correctly Classified Instances 96.5857 % 
Incorrectly Classified Instances 3.4143% 
Time taken to build model 0.21 seconds 
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Class 
0.996 0.054 0.968 0.996 0.982 0.975 warezmaster 
0.983 0.001 0.989 0.983 0.986 0.996 snmpgetattack 
0.994 0.001 0.997 0.994 0.995 0.999 snmpguess 
0.444 0.005 0.533 0.444 0.485 0.709 multihop 
0.294 0.003 0.5 0.294 0.37 0.847 named 
0.786 0.002 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.879 sendmail 
0 0 0 0 0 0.431 worm 
0.333 0.002 0.5 0.333 0.4 0.67 xlock 
0 0 0 0 0 0.613 xsnoop 
0 0 0 0 0 0.443 ftp_write 
0 0 0 0 0 0.213 imap 
0 0 0 0 0 0.745 phf 
0.966 0.034 0.954 0.966 0.96 0.972  Avg 
Table  6.17  Detailed Accuracy for R2L 
(C = telnet) and (E >= 4209) => AP=worm  
(AL >= 0.51) and (A <= 26) => AP=ftp_write  
(F >= 1829) and (U >= 1) => AP=xsnoop ……………………………………………….. 
Table  6.18 RIPPER rules for R2L 
Number of Rules 11 
Correctly Classified 
Instances 97.5542 % 
Incorrectly Classified 
Instances   2.4458 % 
Time taken to build model 0.12 seconds 
            
Table  6.19  Detailed accuracy for U2R 
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Class 
1 0.065 0.99 1 0.995 0.973 guess_passwd 
0.55 0.004 0.688 0.55 0.611 0.882 buffer_overflow 
0.97 0 1 0.97 0.985 0.973 httptunnel 
0.667 0.006 0.556 0.667 0.606 0.842 ps 
0 0.001 0 0 0 0.444 loadmodule 
0.615 0.004 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.817 xterm 
0.538 0.002 0.7 0.538 0.609 0.806 rootkit 
0 0 0 0 0 0.739 sqlattack 
0.976 0.056 0.972 0.976 0.973 0.965 Avg 
Table  6.20 Detailed accuracy for U2R 
 
(Q >= 3) and (A <= 2) => AP=sqlattack (2.0/0.0) 
(R >= 1) and (J <= 0) => AP=perl (2.0/0.0) 
 (C = other) => AP=httptunnel (130.0/0.0) 
 => AP=guess_passwd (1234.0/3.0) 
……………………………………………….. 
Table  6.21  RIPPER Rules for U2R 
 
A 
 b c d e f g h i <-- classified as 
1231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a = guess_passwd 
3 11 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 b = buffer_overflow 
0 1 129 2 0 0 1 0 0 c = httptunnel 
2 2 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 d = ps 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 e = loadmodule 
2 2 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 f = xterm 
1 0 0 2 1 2 7 0 0 g = rootkit 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h = perl 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i = sqlattack 
Table  6.22  Confusion matrix for U2R 
In the above results, we have reported the performance of our approach.  In terms of the 
number of rules and the time taken to build our model, it is obvious in Figure  6.4 and 
Figure  6.5 , that our approach is faster in terms of the time to build the model with fewer rules. 
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Figure  6.4  Number of rules 
                                                
 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
In this chapter we have successfully generated signatures from AIDS to detect Known and 
unknown attacks to store in signature database through multi-stage. Once the signatures have 
been generated, you will be protecting against malware. Also, the benefit of the proposed 
multi-stage Rules is not only the higher accuracy but also the improved scalability, such as 
when novel attacks of a particular class are added to the dataset. Our learned rules are efficient 
in automatically detecting an attack in multi-stage. We generate several rules from data mining 
techniques that can apply to learn rules to detect known attacks, unknown attacks and identify 
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Figure 6.5  Time taken to build model 
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an attack group.  The experimental results show that the Multi stage rules help to detect new 
attacks whose behaviour are diﬀerent from the normal behaviour. 
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Chapter 7 : An Approach to Mitigate SQL Injection 
Attack 
              
In this chapter, we propose an approach for mitigating SQL injection attack (SQLIA). SQLIA 
is a serious threat to web applications. Successful SQLIAs can have serious consequences for 
the victimized organization that include financial loss, loss of reputation, compliance and 
regulatory breach. Therefore, developing approaches for mitigating SQLIA is of paramount 
importance. To this end, we propose an approach based on negative tainting along with SQL 
keyword analysis for detecting and preventing SQLIA. We have tested our proposed 
approach on all types of SQLIAs techniques by generating SQL queries containing legitimate 
SQL commands and SQLIA. We present an analysis and evaluation of the proposed approach 
to demonstrate its effectiveness in detecting and protecting against SQLIA attack.   
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7.1  Introduction 
SQLIA is becoming extensively more widespread amongst hackers community. SQLIA and 
DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks are the most popular topics on hacker 
forums[114]. SQLIA is a type of attack on web applications, which occurs when an attacker 
inputs malicious strings as parameters in legitimate SQL statements [115]. A SQLIA attacker 
takes advantage of improper coding of the web applications that allows the hacker to inject a 
SQL query to get access to the data in the database. It is considered one of the most popular 
web application attack techniques used nowadays.  It is a serious threat to web applications as 
it allows the hackers to gain complete access to the database server.  
Although  defensive  coding, such as input validation represents a good mechanism to 
protect against SQLIA, they cannot protect against evasion techniques [116]. Also, this 
cannot protect the legacy web application that already has been deployed.   A more common 
technique is preparing the SQL statement.  This is used widely among commercial web 
development tools to protect against SQLIA. These statements are mainly created for the 
purpose of building efficient SQL queries and thus are not designed to prevent SQLIA. 
Moreover, defensive coding is expensive, which makes it an impractical technique for 
protecting large legacy systems. 
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are unworkable against SQLIA, 
because the signature keywords can be passed using the evasion techniques or alternate 
character encodings. SQLIA are still succeeding, and the defensive mechanisms are failing, 
for instance for the nonexistence of the right signature. Also, web application have been 
attacked by using SQLIA via the firewall on port 80 or 443[117]. 
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Web applications are deployed in many diverse forms with a wide range of functional 
capabilities. For that reason, there are several possible ways for malicious input to these web 
applications. However, specifying all of them is naturally problematic and leads to high 
negative rate [118]. For instance, developers initially assumed that only direct user input 
needed to be marked as tainted. Successful SQLIAs confirmed that other malicious inputs 
sources, such as browser cookies, also needed to be considered [108].  
The most well-known Malware and crime tool kits are those associated with the 
SQLIA such as Asprox, Conficker, Zeus and SpyEye [119-121]. These Malware and crime 
tool kits are very dangerous because they target online bank systems and perform criminal 
activities by using SQLIA to help malicious writers to generate illegitimate web sites. Thus, 
the malicious writers incorporate SQLIAs into crime tool kits. The Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) recorded SQL injection as the most dangerous security threat 
affecting Web applications in 2010 [28]. In the previous list in 2007, SQL injection was 
recorded at second place on their list of the ten most critical web application security 
vulnerabilities [122]. A recent survey conducted by GreenSQL, reveals that 88% of 
organizations still fail to protect their databases against both internal and external threats,  
and SQLIAs occur more than 70 times per hour [123]. 
During the past few years, a great deal of attention has been given to the problem of 
SQLIAs. However, most of the existing research has not addressed the full aspects of the 
SQLIAs. There are many techniques of SQLIAs and new advanced evasion techniques are 
being created. The need for consideration of these techniques is becoming urgent. Otherwise, 
different cybercrime threats will occur, which will result in serious threats to business. In this 
chapter, we propose a general model for protecting and detecting SQLIA, based on SQL 
syntax at the web application layer, and negative taint at the database layer. The central idea 
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is monitoring the data that comes from user’s web browsers and matching with taint table on 
the database layer in real time. If any of it is malicious and is recognized from user input, we 
stop the SQL statement from execution. Our techniques have been successful against all types 
of SQLIAs because the dynamic SQL statement is monitored through the database layer. The 
main contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:  A new approach to detect and 
prevent SQLIA at runtime. We applied a negative taint in database layer to enable us to 
identify untrusted data at the database layer. Thus, our method is able to detect maliciousness 
caused by tricky data and obfuscation techniques while minimizing false negatives. The 
major advantage of our approach apart from efficiency is that it does not change the web 
architecture.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. An overview of the problem and 
related work is discussed in Section 2. An overview of the SQLIAs techniques is explained in 
Section 3. An evasion method of the SQLIAs techniques is discussed in Section 4. An 
overview of the proposed technique is presented in Section 5. We then present the results of 
the evaluation of the proposed approach in Section 6. The concluding remarks are presented 
in Section 6.   
7.2  Background 
In this section, we present the SQL injection on web application. We also formalize the 
SQLIA detection problem in section 7.2.1. Related work is discussed in section 7.2.2. Impact 
of SQL is discussed in section 7.2.3. Mitigation techniques are presented in section 7.2.4.  
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7.2.1  SQL Injection 
Generally, web applications use query statements to generate strings to interact with 
the database. Usually these queries are generated by the web application servers such as ASP, 
JSP and PHP.  A string contains both the query itself and parameters, which can be the user 
name and password, then, the string is forwarded to the database server for checking as a 
single Structured Query Language (SQL) statement, if the received string is compromised or 
injected it may cause data leakage. Therefore, it is necessary to protect web applications from 
illegal access. 
Web applications are infamous for security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
cybercriminals. The global accessibility of web applications is a serious problem, rendering 
them vulnerable to attack. One of the main threats on the web applications is SQLIAs that are 
extremely widespread in web applications [124]. Web applications offer an excellent facility 
to access the database through the internet [125], which has provided the required service to 
customers. Unfortunately, these advantages have raised a number of security vulnerabilities 
from improper code. As a result, Structured Query Language Vulnerabilities (SQLV) enable 
hackers to influence the SQL that a web application passes to the back-end of a database by 
inserting malicious code into strings to gain unauthorized access to a database to retrieve 
information or destroy the database (DB). Web application security generally focuses on 
identifying vulnerabilities and malicious strings within web applications layer. Firewalls and 
Secure Sockets  Layer (SSL) protocol just protect information that is transferred between the 
site and client, but does not protect information against web application hackers, as they are 
built on top of web application infrastructure [126]. Therefore, it is easy to append data and 
commands into SQL statements. Even normal users can attempt direct connections to the 
databases through specific ports, bypassing the security mechanism [127]. 
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SQLIA attacks are presented through specific characters an attacker enters on web 
applications to generate SQL queries. This can negatively impact business because it can lead 
to the exposure of all of the critical data stored in the database, such as, passwords, credit 
card, and personal information and so on.  SQLIA is normally used to compromise data base 
systems through vulnerable web applications. The SQLIA permits the attacker to get access 
to the whole or partial contents of databases. Moreover, SQLIA can make modifications to 
both the database schema and the contents. To perform a SQLIA in most cases, Web forms 
are used to inject part of SQL query. By entering SQL keywords and control signs, an 
attacker is able to alter the structure of a SQL statement.  
In SQLIA, malicious writers can take advantage of poor web application development 
to launch their attack. The vulnerability happens when a web application has an improper 
authentication mechanism to validate the username and password. Normally, login 
authentication in a web page has two text box fields for entering a user name and password. 
Let user_name and user_password represent the names of these fields sequentially.  
 
 
Figure  7.1  SQL injection example 
 
 The following code shows how to generate a dynamic SQL query: 
 
SELECT user_name user_ password FROM users WHERE user_name=’" + 
user_name+ "’ AND  user_password=’" + user_password+ "’ 
The above SQL statement aimed to check the user name and password that exist in 
the database with the user name and password that were entered by the user in the web form 
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as shown in Figure  7.1. The basic method of SQLIA contains straight addition of string into 
parameters that are attached with the structure of SQL. A very straightforward potential 
attack may occur by easily inputting a string such as like “1 OR 1=1” in the input field, the 
consequences from these inputs retrieve all database data. Another scenario is if an attacker 
enters “user1 --” as the user name and leaves password empty. The user’s input is generated 
as the following SQL query: 
 SELECT user_name,user_password FROM users WHERE uname=’ user1 
--’’ AND pass=’ ’ 
When the database server executes the above query, the WHERE clause will be true and the 
structure of the SQL statement is corrected. The consequences from the above query are that 
the attacker can get access to the database without requiring a valid user name or password. 
7.2.2  Related Work 
There has been a lot of research performed on the subject of detecting and preventing SQLIA.  
Abawajy has suggested SQLIA detection and prevention approach for RFID (Radio 
Frequency Identification) systems [128].  These techniques work very well in the RFID tag 
based SQLIA. In other work, Fernando and Abawajy address SQLIAs through developing a 
model of legitimate SQL statements and then matching the generation query to conform to 
this approach through runtime monitoring [129]. The problem with this approach is that it 
assumes the existence of the original SQL structure.  Unfortunately, very little work exists 
dealing with the full aspects of SQLIAs. A simple technique is to check for single quotes and 
dashes, and escape them manually. This is easily beaten, as attackers can simply adjust their 
input for the escaped characters. 
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Web based SQLIA attacks Static Analysis: Pixy [130] is an open source prototype 
aimed at detecting SQL injection, cross-site scripting, or command injection based on flow-
sensitive, inter-procedural and context-sensitive data flow analysis. In addition Pixy uses 
literal analysis to improve the rightness and precision for its results.  
Combined Static and Dynamic Analysis: AMNESIA [131] is a technique that 
combines dynamic and static for preventing and detecting web application vulnerabilities at 
runtime. AMNESIA uses static analysis to generate different type of query statements. In the 
dynamic phase, AMNESIA interprets all SQL statements before they are submit to the 
database and validates each SQL statement against the static models. It stops all queries 
before they are sent to the database and validates each SQL statement compared to the 
AMNESIA models. However, the primary limitation in AMNESIA according to Ramaraj 
[132] is that the technique is dependent on the accuracy of its static analysis for building 
query models for successful prevention of SQL injection. Furthermore, AMNESIA doesn’t 
consider there are certain types of code obfuscation or query development techniques that 
could make this step less precise and result in both false positives and false negatives. 
Moreover, Martin, Livshits and Lam [133] proposed Program Query Language (PQL) 
that used static analysis and dynamic techniques to detect vulnerabilities in web applications. 
In static analysis information flow techniques are used to detect when malicious input has 
been used to generate an SQL query statement; these statements are then flagged as SQLIA 
vulnerabilities. According to Ramaraj [132] the limitation of this approach is that it can detect 
only known patterns of SQLIA. 
Taint Based Approaches: WebSSARI (Web application Security via Static Analysis 
and Runtime Inspection) [134] is a tool proposed to statically validate existing web 
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applications and legacy web application code without any extra effort for the programmer 
and automatically protect potentially defective code. In this model, static analysis is applied 
to validate input runs versus given conditions for sensitive formulation. 
Code Checkers are based on static analysis of web application that can reduce SQL 
injection vulnerabilities and detect type errors. For instance, JDBC-Checker [135] is a tool 
used to code check by statically validating the type rightness of dynamically-generated SQL 
queries. However, researchers have also developed particular packages that can be applied to 
make SQL query statement safe [136]. These techniques are good, but they require extra 
effort from programmers to build queries statements using Application Program Interface 
(APIs) especially for legacy web application because of the lack of information about the 
intent of the programmer. 
Tainted Data Tracking: this method is proposed by Halfond [137], it is based on  track 
tainted-ness of data and checks specifically for dangerous content that comes from user input.  
According to Nguyen-Tuong et. al.[138] this can be done via instrumenting the run time 
environment or interpreter of the back-end scripting language. When an SQL statement is 
sent to the database server, its syntax tree is first examined. However, this approach does not 
provide any way to check the correctness of the input validation routines [139]. programs that 
use incomplete input checking routines may pass these checks and still be vulnerable to 
injection attacks [124] . 
A number of commercial tools have a strong package library to help a developer for 
writing protection code against SQLIAs.  For instance, J2EE has an especially SQL query 
against SQLIAs, and Microsoft’s NET has the same.  The efficiency of these SQL query 
statements at protecting from SQLIAs is reliant on the development stage, which is based in 
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database layer, and these are typically written by the third party vendors. Thus, it is very 
difficult to use these commercial tools for legacy web applications.  
7.2.3  Impact of SQL Injection 
Several of the prominent SQLIAs affected information security because of the break of 
confidentiality in the information stored in the Databases. This loss of confidentiality and the 
resulting financial costs for recovery, downtime, regulatory penalties, and negative publicity 
represent the primary immediate consequences of a successful compromise.  Table  7.1 shows 
the Impacts of a successful SQLIA. 
Impacts Explanation 
Authentication 
Bypass 
This attack allows SQLI attacker to get access to a database layer, 
possibly with administrative privileges, without providing a correct 
username or password. 
Information 
Disclosure 
This attack allows SQLI attacker to gain for sensitive information 
that is stored in a database such as credit card information. 
Compromised Data 
Integrity 
This attack allows SQLI attacker to modify the contents of web 
page. The consequence is defacing a web page. 
Compromised 
Availability of Data 
This attack allows SQLI attacker to remove information in order to 
cause damage to information that is stored in a database. 
Remote Command 
Execution 
This attack allows SQLI attacker to perform command execution 
through a database, which let the attacker control for the operating 
system. 
Table  7.1  Impacts of successful SQLIA 
SQL injection attacks have been related with many high profile data breaches as 
shown in the Table  7.2.  
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Year Example References 
2008 - Appear Malware that use SQLIA such as Asprox. Asprox 
is a kind of Malware that used the two threat vectors of 
forming a botnet and of generating SQLIAs. .Asprox is 
used SQLIAs techniques in order to expand its Botnet. It 
is attack legitimate websites and injects scripts that 
redirected the users to illegitimate web sites. 
[140] 
2009 - The site of BitDefender's Portugese, Kaspersky and  F-
Secure  web sites were hacked using the SQLIAs. 
[141] [142]. 
2009 - The US Justice Department charged an American citizen 
Albert Gonzalez and two unidentified Russian 
accomplices on charges related to data intrusions at 
Heartland, Hannaford Bros., 7-Eleven Inc.  
- Gonzalez is alleged to have masterminded an international 
operation that stole a staggering 130 million credit and 
debit cards from those companies.  
[143] 
2010 - Half million web sites are hit with automated SQLIA.  
-  Royal Navy web site has been attacked by SQLIA. 
[122] 
2011 - Barracuda, vendor of web application firewall, breached 
by SQL Injection. 
- Sony breached by automated SQL injection attack: Sony 
BMG Greece, Sony Music Japan, Sony Canada, Sony 
Pictures France, Sony, pictures Russia. 
[144] 
2012 - SQLIA attackers have lunch attack against the following 
sites: LinkedIn, eHarmony, Last.fm, Yahoo, Android 
Forums, Billabong, Formspring, Nvidia, and Gamigo. 
- Nvidia acknowledged SQLIA attacker swiped up to 
400,000 user accounts. 
[122] 
2013 - SQL injection found on the site of islamic bank 
Bangladesh. 
[114] 
Table  7.2   Real examples of SQLIA attack 
7.2.4  Mitigation Techniques 
In this subsection, we present various techniques to prevent SQLIA and explain how 
these techniques protect against SQLIA and explain the short comings of each technique. 
Table  7.3 shows various mitigation techniques against SQLIA with explanations and 
drawbacks.
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There are two methods to input validation. 
Blacklisting and whitelisting. With 
blacklisting, identified malicious code are 
removed from or replaced in user input. 
Whitelisting inspects every piece of user 
request against predefined characters. This 
approach is more successful to protect 
SQL injection, as it is more restrictive 
concerning which types of input are 
allowed. 
Blacklisting can fail to correctly 
prevent a new malicious code and 
complex obfuscation, which may 
possibly permit an attacker to 
disrupt filters and possibly inject 
SQL statements. 
Whitelisting has to inspect every 
piece of user requested versus the 
predefine format. 
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Parameterised queries permit a developer 
to create a SQL statement once, and then 
perform that statement many times using 
different parameters. Is is used to 
implement the similar SQL statement to 
force the user input to be treated as the 
content of a parameter. 
 
The effectiveness of prepared 
statements is dependent on their 
implementation, which is 
contained in database drivers, and 
thus normally developed by third 
party vendors. 
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A stored procedure is a set of SQL 
statements with an allocated name that 
stores in the database in a compiled form.  
SQL injection may still be exit, 
especially if dynamic SQL is not 
managed appropriately within a 
stored procedure. 
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This is can be achieved by implementing 
the permission model such restriction 
connect to the database with administrator 
privileges.  
Setting least privilege on database 
layer provides only limited help. 
Every database account should be 
assigned the least privileges 
necessary to access the database. 
That is why restricting access to 
stored procedures can be so 
effective 
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SQLA attacker takes benefit of non-
validated codes to inject web pages. A 
straight-forward way to prevent injections 
is to enhance the reliability of program 
code by audit and review the code. For 
example, Perform secure logging and error 
handling. Also, the application should 
prevent disclosing detailed error 
information to the end user. 
Identifying and mitigating 
vulnerabilities early in the 
development lifecycle can be 
expressively additional cost 
effective. 
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WAG works like a reverse web proxy, 
except that it is much more secure. It can 
interpret more information in the HTTP 
protocol and HTML content, it checks. 
It is difficult to configure it 
accurately, particularly for 
protecting SQL injection attacks 
on free-format text input. 
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Web Application Firewalls give an 
additional layer of database protection 
against numerous approaches of attack. It 
is monitor and block malicious SQL 
execution, as well as sanitizing error 
message send from database server back 
to the client application.  
While application firewalls can 
reduce the likelihood of a 
compromise, they are not a cure 
for protecting systems against 
SQL injection. 
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 It monitors for known or potential 
malicious activities in the computer 
system and raises an alarm when a 
malicious activity is detected. 
IDS technology is susceptible to 
detection evasion and can’t 
handle SSL traffic 
Table  7.3  Various mitigation techniques against SQLIA with explanation and drawback 
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7.3  SQL Injection Attack Techniques 
7.3.1  Tautology 
Tautology-based attacks work through injecting code by one or more conditional SQL 
statement queries in order to make the SQL command evaluate as a true condition. The most 
common use of this technique is to bypass authentication on web pages, resulting in access to 
the database. 
The SQL injected command below shows how the attacker can make the SQL 
command evaluate as true without knowing either the password or the username. Attackers 
can achieve this by many methods, one of these is by using blank statements for the username 
and for the password using a true condition such as (1=1) or (- -) resulting in accessing the 
database or returning all the data in the table username. 
SELECT * FROM userTable  WHERE username=’’OR 1=1 --AND 
password=’’ 
Detecting tautology techniques can be extremely difficult, as SQL statements allow a 
broad scope of user definition functions and open permitting inputs values. However, the 
attackers can input many forms of tautologies like: 
2=2, 3=3, ‘1’=’1’, 'b'=‘b” or "name"="name” …. 
This will be considered as a valid statement regardless of the username input by the 
SQLIAs, and will be able to bypass authentication mechanisms. For example, other SQL 
tautologies are 'user1' LIKE '%user%’ which are created from operators. However, the 
SQLIA attacker can simply handle the original SQL query by adding character to include a 
tautology, such as 22 OR 1=1.   
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7.3.2  Union Query 
Union attacks use an operator which combines results to retrieve additional information.  
UNIONS added to an addition statement execute a second statement and third statement to 
retrieve information from a specified table. If the Attacker identifies the structure of the 
tables, they can simply attach another statement using union query, as shown in the following 
example: 
SELECT pass FROM user_table1 WHERE loginID=’’ UNION SELECT 
pass from user_table2 where Username=xxx -- AND pass=’’. 
7.3.3  Stored Procedures 
A stored procedure is a subroutine available to most commercial databases in order to reuse 
the code. Once the stored procedure is modified, all clients automatically get the new version. 
Stored procedures provide developers with an extra layer of abstraction because they can 
enforce business wide database rules, independent of the logic of individual web applications. 
Unfortunately, it is a common misconception that the   mere use of stored procedures protects 
an application from SQLIAs. Attackers try to execute stored procedures that are stored in the 
database. Specifically, most database companies store procedures that extend the 
functionality of the database and allow for interaction with the targets beyond the database 
and operating system. With stored procedures, the code that creates the query is stored and 
executed on the database. The following example of stored procedures shows how the 
attacker exploits a parameterized stored procedure. 
 
CREATE PROCEDURE DBName .is Authenticated 
@user Name varchar2, @pass varchar2, @pin int AS EXEC("SELECT 
accounts FROM users 
WHERE login='" +@user Name+ If' and pass='" +@password+ and 
pass=" +@pass); 
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The authorized/unauthorized user stored procedure returns true/false. If the SQLIAs 
input SHUTDOWN; - -" for username or password. Result, the stored procedure generates 
the following query statement: 
SELECT Username FROM UserTable WHERE username= user1 AND 
pass=' '; SHUTDOWN; 
7.3.4  Piggy-Backed Queries 
Piggy-backed Queries is a type of attack that compromises a database using a query 
delimiter, such as "; ", to inject additional query statements to the original query. While the 
original query is a legitimate query, additional queries could be illicit. The result is that the 
attacker can inject any SQL command to the database. In the following example, the attacker 
injects 0; drop table user" into the pin input field instead of logical value. Then the 
application would produce the query: 
SELECT pass FROM userTable WHERE login='user1' AND Password = 
0; drop table users 
The database accepts both queries statements and executes them. The second query is 
an illegal statement, and the result drops the users table from the database. 
7.3.5  Blind Injection 
This occurs when programmers forget to hide an error, which renders the web application 
insecure, this error message help SQLIA to compromise the database by asking a series of 
logical questions through SQL statements. 
SELECT pass FROM userTable WHERE username= 'user' and 1 =0 -- 
AND pass = AND pin= 0 SELECT info FROM userTable WHERE 
username= 'user' and = 1 -- AND pass = AND pass= 0 
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In the above example, the SQLIAs send the first query with a logical error and receive 
an error message such as “1 =0” because this error message enables the attacker to 
understand the structure of database. Once the attacker understands the structure they can 
then send a query which is mostly true. 
7.3.6  Timing Attacks 
The SQLIAs collect information from a database by monitoring the response time of the 
database. This kind of attack is used as a condition statement to achieve a time delay purpose. 
declare @varchar(8000) select @ = db_Alias() if 
(ascii(substring(@, 1, 1)) & ( power(2,0))) > 0 waitfor  delay 
'0:0:6'  
7.4  Evasion Methods 
Signature detection or pattern matching engines have been shown to be inefficient in the 
detection of SQL injection [145]. There are many methods adopted by malicious authors in 
order to evade detection engines [146] [80]. For every signature created, a new evasion 
technique can be developed, as the malicious authors take advantage of the rich language 
provided by SQL to fool and thwart the signature based detection. Also, a recent effort by 
malicious writers to automate the finding of web application vulnerability has increased. The 
following sub section outlines the popular evasion methods that have been adopted by 
Malware authors. 
7.4.1  Encoding Evasion 
One of the earliest methods noted and used by malicious authors is using the equivalent of 
text in order to defeat detection engines, in the same way as Domain Name Server (DNS) 
   154 
 
changes the domain name to an IP address. Hence the user does not know the IP address but 
knows the domain name.  Encoding evasion methods are illustrated in Table  7.4. 
Logical and Equivalence 
Expressions 
SQL statement SQL injection 
Base 64 1=1    MT0x 
Encoding  Decimal 1=1 &#49;&#61;&#49; 
Encoding Hex 1=1 313d31 
URL Encoding 1=1 1%3D1 
UTF-8 Base10 1=1 049 061 049 
Table  7.4 Encoding evasion method 
7.4.2   White Spaces Evasion 
Since keyword sequence is counted as a string, malicious authors are adopting the use of 
white spaces in order to evade detection. White space around the same code will lead to 
evasion from the detection engine because the signatures methods are generally looking for 
the exact text match. To achieve this, the attacker has to add one or more spaces around the 
SQL keywords in order to overcome the signature detection of text with no spaces. Table 3 
below shows an example. However, detection engines can remove all the white spaces from 
the SQL statement in order to detect malicious code. Therefore, malicious authors are using 
not just whitespace they also use special characters such as Tab, Enter key (carriage return) 
and line feed around SQL keywords in order to evade from signature based detection. 
Examples of such evasion are the use of '\t' for tab, ‘\n’ for a new line, as shown in Table  7.5. 
Comment Evasion SQL statement SQL injection 
Using comment /* */ Union Un/* */ ion 
Using comment -- Union Un--ion 
Table  7.5  White Spaces Evasion Method 
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7.4.3  Comment Evasion 
Malicious writers use comments to break the SQL keywords without any effect on the code 
in order to evade signature detection. Table  7.6 illustrates this method. 
Comment Evasion SQL statement SQL injection 
Tab 1 '\t'=1 Char(9) 
Carriage return 1 ‘\n’=1 Char(13) 
Line feed 1=1 Char(10) 
Table  7.6  Comment evasion 
7.4.4  Logical and Equivalence Expressions Evasion 
Malicious authors use the logical, mathematical or equivalence expressions in order to evade 
detection as shown in Table  7.7.  A generic signature is likely to lead to false positives since 
some combination of “or” and “=” are likely to legitimately occur within normal Web 
content. But even if it did not lead to false positives, it can also be easily evaded by simply 
replacing such an expression with a malicious expression that evaluates as true. 
Encoding Evasion Method SQL statement SQL injection 
Logical expression 2>1 2>1 
Mathematic expression 4=4 1+3=2+2 
Equivalence expression 1=1 user=user 
Table  7.7  Logical and equivalence expressions evasion method 
7.4.5  String Techniques Evasion 
Hackers evade signature detection by breaking SQL keywords using concatenation symbols. 
Examples of such methods are shown in Table  7.8. 
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String Techniques Evasion SQL Statement SQL Injection 
Variable a$=union a$ 
Concatenation Union Un||ion 
Table  7.8  String techniques evasion method 
7.5  SQLIA detection and prevention approach 
The proposed SQLI detection and prevention approach is illustrated in Figure  7.2. The client 
first requests a page, either static or dynamic, and the web browser passes the request to the 
web server. The web server handles the requests by decoding the webpage. Subsequently, the 
web server passes this request to the web application server, and the web application server 
activates the business tier that allows connection to the database. This layer processes 
commands, verifies security access to database through middleware such as JDBC, SQLJ, or 
JDO API, ODBC, etc. and makes logical decisions. After verifying the database access, the 
web application server sends the SQL requests to the database server. The database server 
processes the request by allowing it to store, delete and update the data, depending on the 
SQL query, and sends back the results to the application server. 
 In web application layer we perform negative taints by storing untrusted markings, based 
on the evasion methods discussed above, at the database layer. In web application server, we 
performed syntax-aware evaluation of query strings, before executing the query in the 
database.  This matching process is done with SQL keywords and operators, by validating 
queries whose input matches with untrusted markings that contain one or more characters 
without trust markings. These conceptual advantages of positive tainting are especially 
significant in preventing SQLIAs. The way in which Web applications create SQL 
commands makes the identification of all untrusted data especially problematic and, most 
importantly, the identification of all trusted data relatively straight forward. In detecting 
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SQLIAs, the technique uses runtime checking to examine the SQL queries and match them 
against the signature database. The proposed model evaluates the query and checks for 
parameterized queries that are widely used in web technology (such as JSP, ASP, and PHP) 
so that the data gets separated through parameters [117]. 
 
 
Figure  7.2 New strategy of SQL mitigation 
 
Usernames Password SQL Legitimate Database Access 
T T T YES 
T T F NO 
T F T NO 
T F F NO 
F T T NO 
F T F NO 
F F T NO 
F F F NO 
Table  7.9  Input validation 
For effective prevention, we implemented the signature with regular expression style 
in the database to capture illegitimate SQL statements. Table  7.10 shows the contents of 
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SQLIA signatures and matching expression symbols. Alphanumeric means the alphabet. 
Comment Mark points out that the rest of the SQL statement is ignored and does not have 
any effect on SQL statement. Quotation Mark indicates the boundary of SQL. Type means 
the data variable in the SQL statement. SQL Keyword contains all SQL data manipulation 
keywords such as select, insert, update and delete. Data definition keywords such as create a 
table and drop table. Data control keywords such grant and revoke privileges. Delimiter Mark 
is indicating of end an SQL query statement. Square brackets are used to encase characters or 
ranges of characters in database searches. 
Elements Symbols 
Alphanumeric {a, b,…,z}, {A,B,..,Z},{0,1,..,9} 
Comment Mark {//,--} 
Quotation Mark {“,’} 
Arithmetic operation {+,-,/,*} 
Logical Keyword {AND, OR} 
Delimiter Mark {;} 
SQL keyword create, select, drop, delete 
Data Definition Char, number 
…… ……. 
Table  7.10  Elements and symbols in signature. 
The goal of this work is to detect illegitimate access to the database, where the 
username and password are correctly validated, as shown in Table 7.9. To achieve our goal, 
we maintain a lookup table containing possible vulnerabilities that malicious authors exploit 
using evasion methods as discussed above. Using our negative taint model, all requests 
(whether legitimate or not) received by the web server are validated for authentic database 
connections through username and password matches for markings with a vulnerability table 
before they are forwarded to the database server. 
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Algorithm 1 shows the checking negative taint; the algorithm takes the user name 
input, password input and table that contain malicious string from database. The algorithm  
runs the user inputs against matching taints set which is  stored in the database, if the user’s 
inputs match with the database then it raises an alarm, if the user’s input contains the 
keyword from the taint set then this creates attack vectors. 
Algorithm 1 to prevent SQLIA. 
Inputs: UserName, Password, Table Taint 
Output: Injection= True/False 
 
While username not null OR password not null do 
Validate UserName and Password against  
TaintSets Table 
If (UserName OR Password In Table Taint) Then  
Return true 
Else 
Return False 
 
7.6  Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we present an analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed approach 
to show its efficiency in preventing SQLIA attack. We also discuss the results of the 
experiment.  
7.6.1  Experiment Setup 
We implemented our method by using oracle 10g for the database layer and simulated a 
hacking environment using datasets containing both SQL injected Queries and legitimate 
queries. The middle tier is configured as the web application server. Also, we created the 
login tables for all the users’ names with their passwords as shown in Table  7.11.  
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Username Password 
User1 User1 
 User2  User2 
Table  7.11 User tables 
SQL Create Table: to create login tables in the Database  
Create table login (usernames varchar(20), password  
varchar(20), primary key (username)); 
The vulnerabilities in Table  7.10 configure as the following:  
SQL Create Table: to create TAINTS tables in the Database  
Create table TAINTS (keyword varchar2 (20) primary key); 
The following Java code, used to perform a login function, and perform SQLIA 
detection at the web application layer:  
 
Algorithm 2 SQLIA Detection. 
UserPass = request.getParameter("password").toString(); 
strQuery="select * from login where” 
IF(request.getParameter("username")!=null && request.getParame
ter("username")!="" && request.getParameter("password")!=null 
&&  request.getParameter("password")!="" AND 
request.getParameter ("username")!= NOT IN  
(select keyword from TAINTS ) AND 
request.getParameter("password") != NOT In 
(select keyword from TAINTS )){ strQuery=" 
username='"+username+"' AND  password='"+userpass+"'"; 
st = conn.createStatement(); 
 rs = st.executeQuery(strQuery);} 
Else 
response.sendRedirect("login.jsp"); 
                     
The SQL statement with username and password matched correctly may not always 
mean it is a legitimate statement, as they may contain vulnerabilities exploited by malicious 
authors using the abovementioned evasion methods. Using our proposed model, SQL queries 
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that contain vulnerabilities are identified as SQLIAs are blocked, and a report generated is 
sent to the web developer and database administrator. 
7.6.2  Empirical Evaluation 
In our evaluation, we evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of our method.  
Q1.  What Percentage of correctly identified SQLIA? This question addresses True 
detection Rate (TP rate) 
Q2. What Percentage of wrongly identified SQLIA?  This question addresses False 
Negative alarm Rate (FN rate). 
Q3. What Percentage of wrongly identified legitimate SQL query?  This question addresses 
False Positive (FP rate). Which means an activity is normal but it is identified as the SQLIA.  
We conducted our experiments to test our proposed model by generating 1,200 SQL 
queries containing all evasion methods of SQL injection attacks, as well as 1,320 SQL 
queries containing legitimate SQL commands. We evaluated the results by using three 
applications that are available on the internet at GotoCode (http://www.gotocode.com/), these 
are: Employee Directory, Online Bookstore, and Online Portal. Such application sources have 
also been utilized by other researchers [137] for testing purposes. Table  7.12 and Table  7.13 
provide the overall results of our experiments, which indicate that our model provides 100% 
web application protection and 0% for false negative rates and false positive rates. Also, it 
shows that our proposed model has been successful in identifying any of the abovementioned 
popular evasion methods adopted by a SQLIA.  
Standard performance metrics are used to analyze the different test cases which are defined 
as follows: 
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True detection Rate (TP rate): Percentage of correctly identified malicious code. 
TP Rate =  TPTP + FN 
False alarm Rate (FP rate):  Percentage of wrongly identified benign code, given by: 
FP Rate =  FPFP + TN 
Overall Accuracy: Percentage of correctly identified code, given by: 
Overall Accuracy =  TP + TNTP + TN + FP + FN 
Table below shows the percentage of wrongly identified SQLIAs and the percentage of 
correctly identified SQLLAs. 
Application Name Total  Number Of Attacks Successful attack (FN) 
True detection 
(TP)  
Employee Directory 1200 0 1200  
Online Bookstore 1200 0 1200 
Online Portal 1200 0 1200 
Table  7.12  Percentage of wrongly identified SQLIAS and percentage of correctly identified 
SQLLAS 
Table below shows the percentage of wrongly identified legitimate SQL query - false 
positive (FP rate). 
Application 
Name 
Total  number 
of legitimates   False positive 
Employee 
Directory 
1320 0 
Online Bookstore 1320 0 
Online Portal 1320 0 
Table  7.13  Percentage of wrongly identified SQLIAs and percentage of correctly identified 
SQLLAs 
Figure  7.3 shows the results of the experiment. The result provides some assurance 
that the proposed model can be implemented without significant overheads. The timing 
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results show that the proposed approach is efficient as it imposes very low overhead on the 
system, this is normally determined by the actual network speed and database server access. 
 
Figure  7.3  Overhead performance 
Halfond and Lee etc. [147] categorized SQLIA into several categories and used them 
to evaluate the effectiveness for prevention of  SQLIAs. We used the same techniques as 
Halfond to evaluate our techniques via other techniques. The results are shown in Table  7.14. 
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7.7  Conclusions 
SQLIAs pose a serious threat to web applications, hence the primary purpose of this research 
was to present a new model to protect and detect web applications against SQLIAs with the 
least modification of the Web architecture. This chapter presents a generic protection and 
detection approach against SQL injection attacks, applicable to new and legacy web 
applications. The chapter starts with an explanation and overview of SQL injection attack 
types, enumerates their impact and real-life attack cases, and enlists the evasion methods 
commonly used by attackers to mask their payload. Next the chapter describes the approach, 
which combines an input validation and tainting check (based on a blacklist of known SQL 
keyword and evasion techniques) with a run-time check before sending the query to the 
database. Our proposed model was developed based on negative tainting and SQL syntax-
awareness methods, and was evaluated through SQL penetration testing in the web 
application and database server. The negative tainting and SQL syntax-awareness that we use 
gives our technique several significant advantages over techniques based on other 
mechanisms. 
Evaluations have been performed using three different applications. We were able to 
successfully distinguish between legitimate SQL queries and malicious ones that had adopted 
various evasion methods such as encoding, comments and white space evasion methods, as 
well as logical expressions and string techniques that were not captured by commercially 
available detection engines. 
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Chapter 8 : Conclusions and Future Directions 
              
 
8.1  Overview 
This chapter provides an overall summary of the research study and briefly describes the 
proposed techniques, the results achieved, and the conclusions. The first section will be an 
open discussion on the main findings of this research topic. Also this section will summarise 
my various contributions toward Malware detection and prevention to the information 
security field of knowledge. The last section throws some light on possible future research 
directions, along with final thoughts. 
8.2  Discussion 
There is a strong sign that the incidence rate of web application attacks will continue to 
increase, while crime toolkits and methods used by malicious writers will rise in advanced 
technical development. This increase in complexity and usability means that the threat is 
more pronounced than it ever has been, and the automation behind the attacks is increasing 
the scale of application.  Having investigated these crime toolkits, we make the prediction 
that this complexity will rise in the future, although ironically, so too will the usability and 
front-end simplification of attacks. As polymorphic variations increase in complexity, SIDS 
is not adequate. Alternatives, such as behavioural analysis or whitelists, are essential 
countermeasures. It is becoming increasingly difficult for existing detection and prevention 
systems to achieve complete protection from a malicious writer who may have the upper 
controlling position in a situation. In many occurrences a zero day attack gets discovered   
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only   after   the   attack   is   already   done   and   the   computer system   has   been 
compromised. Chapter 3 of this thesis presented details of crime toolkits and how they 
productise cybercrime. We described some attack vectors to web applications, one of the best 
methods for spreading Malware, and examined the most recent crime tool kits that target web 
applications, using Zeus as a case study.  
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we discussed several research problems that have been 
studied relating to Malware detection and prevention. Therefore, we proposed a Malware 
detection and prevention framework to overcome the main shortcomings of existing Malware 
detection and prevention systems as presented in Chapter 2 in order to improve detection 
accuracy, reduced false-alarms and able to deal with new attacks. The proposed detection 
system is based on a combination of SIDS, AIDS and RIDS as presented in Chapter 4.  
We have recognized two key matters that significantly affect the performance of the 
intrusion detection system with regard to Malware detection. First, anomaly-based methods 
cannot achieve a superior performance without a wide-ranging data set and latest training set 
with all various Malware varieties, which is extremely expensive and time-consuming to 
create. Second, combining both SIDS and AIDS to design intrusion detection systems has 
flexibility and it increases the security level. Our experiments have conclusively shown that 
our framework performed efficiently. Chapter 6 demonstrates the way in which we have 
verified the efficiency of our approach against SQL injection attack. 
Moreover, feature selection and multi stage rules are used in the Malware detection 
and prevention system. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 show improvements to the malware detection 
system. There are several reasons for this: firstly, contains feature selection for AIDS. 
Secondly, it is an essential feature to identify new malware. The proposed approach is 
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verified over the KDD’99 dataset. Experimental results show that the proposed feature 
selection is successful in improving the malware detection system. 
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, we have presented prevention and detection of SQLIA at 
runtime. The SIDS is used to identify untrusted data at the database layer. Chapter 7 explains 
in detail how our approach is able to detect maliciousness caused by tricky data and 
obfuscation techniques while minimizing false negatives. From the experimental results our 
proposed model has been successful in identifying the SQLIA. The major advantage of our 
approach, apart from efficiency, is that it does not change the web architecture.  
8.3  Accomplishments 
Therefore, the following questions have been proposed and veriﬁed: 
Question 1: Can a combination of a Signature-based Intrusion Detection system (SIDS) and 
an Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (AIDS) mitigate web application Malware? From the 
experimental results in Chapter 4, this IIDPS, combining signature based detection and 
anomaly based detection, is capable of preventing and distinguishing various types of 
abnormal activity. Signature-based detection techniques were used to recognize known 
attacks, while anomaly based detection techniques were used to recognize previously 
unknown. 
Question 2: It is possible to find features selection methods to achieve high accurate results 
with low false negatives? From the experimental results in Chapter 5, we performed 
experiments to classify each of the five classes: normal, probe, denial of service (DoS), user 
to super-user (U2R), and remote to local (R2L). Our proposed methods outperform other 
state-of-art methods. 
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Question 3: It is possible to generate rules for AIDS that can detect known and unknown 
malicious attacks? From the experimental results in Chapter 6, we provide new multi stage 
rules for detecting anomalies in multi-stage rules. We used the RIPPER for rule generation, 
which is able to create rule sets more quickly and can determine the attack types with smaller 
numbers of rules. These rules would be efficient to apply for Signature Intrusion Detection 
System (SIDS) and Anomaly Intrusion Detection System (AIDS). 
Question 4: Combining signature base detection and anomaly base detection can detect and 
prevent SQL Injection attacks. From the experimental results in Chapter 7, the combination 
of signature base detection and anomaly base detection are capable of detecting the malicious 
code with less error rates than other existing techniques. We were able to successfully 
distinguish between legitimate SQL queries and malicious ones that had adopted various 
evasion methods. 
8.4    Future Work and Final Thoughts 
The work achieved in this thesis presents a basis for future research in Malware 
detection and prevention systems in various areas. One area of future work is applying a 
broader range of features for anomaly detection. These features have to compute in real-time 
to allow the intrusion detection system to keep up with the current high speed network. 
Another possible direction for future work is to use our approach, intelligent intrusion 
detection and prevention system, for detecting and protecting all kind of malware that target 
computer network and web application. Our approach has been shown in this thesis to be 
applicable in web application attack. Also, as future work, we are interested in using more data 
mining techniques, to examine the whole performance of the intrusion detection system. 
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Definitions  
Malware: Many definitions have been given to describe Malware. For example, 
McGraw and Morrisett [154] describe a Malware instance as “any code added, changed, or 
removed from a software system in order to intentionally cause harm or subvert the intended 
function of the system”. There are several different types of Malware. These include viruses, 
worms, Trojan horses, spyware, rootkits and backdoors, etc.  
A zero-day attack: a cyber-attack utilizing a vulnerability that has not been patched. 
There is practically no security against a zero-day attack and intrusion detection system 
cannot detect the attack via signature-based matching. 
Cybercrimes: criminal or risky events that are informational, global and networked 
and are to be differentiated from crimes that basically use computers. They are the utilized by 
transmission media that have created a new style of crime. 
Botnet: a collection of compromised computers communicating with other similar 
programs in order to perform tasks, usually installed via malware, under a common command 
& control infrastructure, controlled by a single person. 
Exploit: a weakness or vulnerability in a program or application that malware writers 
use to compromise a computer system.  
Phishing: It is a criminally fraudulent technique to make an attempt to obtain 
information such as user logion information and credit card information, by masquerading as 
a truthful entity in an electronic communication media. 
Propagation: The method that allows malware to be spread to multiple systems. 
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Web Application Vulnerability: Any weakness in web application architecture, web 
application design, web application configuration, web application code that permits an 
attacker to compromise a web application. 
SQL Injection Attack (SQLIA): is a type of attack on a web application which 
occurs when an attacker inputs malicious strings as parameters in legitimate SQL statement. 
The SQLIA allows the hacker to gain complete access to the database server a serious threat 
to the web application. 
Cross-Site Scripting (CSS):  Is a type of attack on web applications which occur 
when an attacker inserts malicious string or code into a hyper link that appears in a legitimate 
web site. When the internet user clicks on this link, the embedded programming is submitted 
as part of the client's Web request and can execute on the user's computer.  The result from 
this is permitting the attacker to gain critical information. 
Web Malware: Is malicious software - intended to harm an internet users system 
without the user’s permission. “Malware” is the general term that describes the various kinds 
of threats to the computer system. 
Authentication:  Is the techniques that use to verify and identity of users to the Web 
application and website, typically based on a username and password. 
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): Is a type of attack on web application that 
takes advantage of a lack of authorization of Web application. This attack permits an attacker 
to perform malicious commands without the user’s knowledge. In this attack, the attackers 
trick an internet user into clicking on a malicious link which is planned to perform a 
malicious activity on behalf of the users. For example, a user’s may click on a malicious link. 
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Once the users clicked on this link, it redirects the user to an illegitimate web site that forces 
the victim to transfer money from the victim’s bank account to an attacker’s bank account. 
Buffer Overflow: A buffer overflow attack happens when attackers overload systems 
to damage the execution stack of a web application. In this attack the attacker sending 
malicious input to web application, an attacker can cause the web application to execute 
arbitrary code causing damage over all the system.  
Security Misconfiguration: Is a type of attack on a web application that occurs when 
an attacker exploit configuration weaknesses found in web applications. Many web 
applications have unnecessary features, such as default username. These features may help an 
attacker to lunch his activities in order to get access to personal information. 
Insecure Cryptographic Storage: Cryptographic Storage regularly occurs when the 
developers encrypt the information wrongly. The web application encrypts sensitive 
information in a database to avoid revelation to end users. Though, the database has the 
functionality to decrypt queries against the sensitive information. The system should have 
been configured to allow only back end applications to decrypt them, not the front end web 
application. Otherwise, this will allow hackers to attack the database to steal all the critical 
information. 
SQL: Stands for Structured Query Language. It was defined by ANSI (American 
National Standards Institute) and has also been adopted as a standard by ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization). SQL is standard language for accessing and manipulating 
relational database systems [155]. SQL is divided into three parts: the Data Manipulation 
Language (DML), Data Definition Language (DDL) and Data Control Language (DCL). 
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Abbreviations  
AIDS Anomaly based Intrusion Detection System  
 XSS Cross-Site Scripting 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AIS Artificial Immune System  
ANN  Artificial Neural Network  
BN Bayesian Networks 
CPU  Central Process Unit 
CSRF  Cross-Site Request Forgery 
CSS Cross-Site Scripting 
CVE Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
DB DataBase  
DCL Data Control Language  
DDL Data Definition Language 
DDOS  Distributed Denial of Service 
DML Data Manipulation Language  
DoS Denial of Service 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
FN False Negative 
FP False Positive 
GA Genetic Algorithms 
HIDS Host-based Intrusion Detection System  
HMM Hidden Markov Model 
HR  Human Resource 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure  
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IIDPS Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention System  
IRS Intrusion Response System  
ISO  International Organization for Standardization 
NETAD Network Traffic Anomaly Detection 
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project  
PHAD Packet Header Anomaly Detection 
PQL Program Query Language 
R2L Remote to Local  
RAD Rapid Application Development 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification 
RIDS Responses Intrusion Detection System 
SaaS Software-as-a-Service 
SIDS Signature based Intrusion Detection System 
SMO Sequential Minimal Optimization  
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SQL Structured Query Language 
SQLIA SQL Injection Attack 
SQLV Structured Query Language Vulnerabilities  
SSL Secure Sockets Layer  
SVM Support Vector Machine 
TN True Negative 
TP True Positive 
U2R User to Super-user 
URL  Uniform Resource Locator  
WACSP Web Application Security Consortium’s Statistics Project  
WebSSARI  Web application Security via Static Analysis and Runtime Inspection 
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